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ARTICLES

The Theological Curriculum, the Christian and the World . . . . . GEORGE W. BRIGGS 5

The Wind Bloweth Where It Listeth . JOHN CLARK ARCHER 29

Who Is "Satan" and Where Is "Hell"? . . . . . ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY 36

COMMUNICATIONS

Peter Mohyla . . . . . CLARENCE A. MANNING 48

Ananda K. Coomaraswamy . . . MARGUERITE BECK BLOCK 51

BOOK REVIEWS

Charles Johnston: *The Crest-Jewel of Wisdom and Other Writings of Śankarâcharya* . . . . . (SWAMI NIKHILANANDA) 54

Hyman B. Grinstein: *The Rise of the Jewish Community of New York, 1654-1860* . . . . . (Louis I. Newman) 56

Carl-Martin Edsman: *The Body and Eternal Life* . . . . . (Frederick C. Grant) 60

Stanley Cook: *The Rebirth of Christianity* and *An Introduction to the Bible* . . . . . (John E. Smith) 62

John S. Diekhoff: *Milton's Paradise Lost: A Commentary on the Argument* . . . . . (French R. Fogle) 66

Mitchell Salem Fischer: *Robert Boyle—Devout Naturalist* . . . . . (Joseph L. Blau) 71

P. E. Shaw: *The Catholic Apostolic Church, Sometimes Called Irvingite* . . . . . (E. R. Hardy, Jr.) 73

Ragnar Eckström: *The Theology of Charles Gore* . . . . . (Cyril K. Gloyn) 76

J. Milton Yinger: *Religion in the Struggle for Power* . . . . . (Harold Buschman) 79

Ernst Cassirer: *Language and Myth* . . . (John E. Smith) 82

Ananda K. Coomaraswamy: *Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought* . . . . . (Arthur Szathmary) 87

Jean Levie: *Sous les yeux de l'incroyant* . . . . . (Radoslav A. Tsanoff) 89

Herbert W. Schneider: *A History of American Philosophy;* Joseph L. Blau, ed.: *American Philosophical Addresses, 1700-1900* . . . . . (Willard L. Sperry) 92

Book Notes 97

Where the Two Came to Their Father: A Navaho War Ceremonial. Lewis Browne, ed.: *The World's Great Scriptures.* Aram M. Frenkian: *L'Orient et les origines de l'idéalisme subjectif dans la pensée européenne.* J. W. C. Wand: *The New Testament Letters.* Bruno Switalski: *Neoplatonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine.* Taymans d'Eypernon, S. J.: *Le Mystère primordial.* Massey H. Shepherd, Jr.: *The Living Liturgy.* Paul S. Minear: *Eyes of Faith.* Henk Oosterink: *Spirit in Crisis.*

Among the Periodicals 107

THE THEOLOGICAL CURRICULUM, THE CHRISTIAN AND THE WORLD

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Professor of History of Religions (retired), Drew University

IT IS TIME for the Christians to face the fact that they are not meeting the requirements necessary for their effective participation in the affairs of their contemporary world. While military, political, and economic leaders are shaping up events for a new world crisis, the churches are unable to create a united opinion normative to these issues. With the world facing "the worst of all religious wars," a war between political and economic philosophies, in this case, of Russia and the United States, leaders on both sides are unwilling to yield anything for the sake of peace, even though these two ideologies must either live and work together or try to destroy each other.

Christians do not present an effective front to these threats of power; they do not seem able to create or even influence opinion in our growing crisis.

The former president of Union Theological Seminary, after his recent trip abroad, reported that the prestige of the United States in the Orient and in the Moslem world has sunk so low that "it simply cannot go any lower." To illustrate his depressing but realistic message, he pointed to the bitterness of Moslems at the statements that the President and Congress intended "to force" Britain to admit one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine, and to the resentment of the Filipinos when they discovered that the bill for Philippine rehabilitation included a rider which granted the United States "equal rights of exploitation in the Philippines," in violation of their new constitution. Dr. Coffin declared that, "in order to regain prestige, this country must show that its economy can provide the poor man with the requirements for basic subsistence, must defeat racial prejudice at home, and must help to end the inflation that has ruined the economy of the East."[1]

Dr. John W. Burton, of Australia, wrote in 1946: "Less than one hundred and fifty years ago . . . the South Pacific was wholly heathen, and head-hunting, cannibalism, widow-strangling and infanticide were

1. Quoted from *The Christian Century*, May 7, 1947, p. 596.

commonplace. . . . Then War. Our native people experienced an apocalypse of violence and bloody death such as they had never known in their savage state."[2]

We must not forget that the "Christian" West has, within a generation, engulfed the world, including the "heathen," in the two most devastating wars in all history. Political and economic power, joined together, continue to exploit the great masses of men here and abroad. Christians seem to be impotent to change this situation. As Emery Reves puts it: "The failure of Christianity as a civilizing force of society is an incalculable tragedy."[3]

There must be reasons for this condition in which the churches find themselves. And they are such (as we shall see) that they cannot be separated into home and foreign problems. As F. Ernest Johnson says:

> Much of our theological literature, definitely discourages any substantive hope for a better world, any vision of a Christian Society as a stimulus to ethical decision. . . . The moral testimony of our churches has been largely ineffectual because they have considered the Gospel as antithetic to power rather than as a redemptive force for the discipline of power.[4]

The churches are organized for the propagation of Christianity around their trained leadership; consequently, the preparation of the ministry for its task is of fundamental importance. Among the reasons why the ministry as a whole is unable to meet its responsibilities in this contemporary world are the following: (1) Its general ignorance of affairs of world significance and its consequent lack of understanding of them; (2) its unawareness that it is under fire from both within and without the churches; (3) the circumscribed field in which it operates, owing to the limiting effects of its theological and ecclesiastical outlooks; and (4) its general attitude towards other faiths, cultures and races.

I

One great weakness in the churches is their unawareness of what is going on in the world, or their lack of understanding of world affairs as Christians. This situation will continue as long as we have an inade-

2. *The Missionary Review*, May, 1946.
3. *Anatomy of Peace* (New York, 1945), p. 79.
4. *World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations* (New York, 1944), "What Has the War Taught the Churches?," p. 236.

quately informed leadership. Both within and without the churches there are men and women who are appalled at the ignorance of the world exhibited in the pulpit. Ignorance involves a multitude of sins, as we shall see, especially for those who assert that Christianity values man as man.[5]

Take Russia and China as examples. Within recent months there has been a most serious change of mind in the country with respect to Russia. Most Americans are not aware of the forces behind this new attitude toward the Soviet Union. Certainly the churches do not appear to be. We have allowed the situation to degenerate into an increasing show of force. The papers give favorable accounts from occasional visitors to Russia but continue unabated their propaganda against Moscow. The churches have no effective voice in this situation because they are not prepared to speak. There must be understanding if we are to have a world not torn asunder. Peoples of two very different ideologies must be led to recognize that each appears equally strange, dangerous, and impossible to the other. Christians in this country ought to foster an effort in understanding with insight, not of forcing our customary ways on others so as to make them more like ourselves as the only solution. The situation becomes a matter of mutual adjustment. People of insight, returning from surveys of conditions in Europe, are convinced that we shall not succeed *even in our efforts in relief* over there unless we recognize their cultural and ideological differences from us and work from their point of view. But we Christians are not prepared to lead the way to this basic resolution of tensions. The unpreparedness of our leadership may be illustrated by reference to Professor Coe's exposure of the significant silence and absence of courage in the recent pronouncement on Soviet-American relations by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.[6]

5. "The greatest single weakness of American Protestantism," says Professor J. C. Bennett, "is to be found in the number of local churches in which the worshiper is frustrated. (One should add to these the number of local churches where the worshiper would be frustrated if he understood more fully than he does the meaning of the gospel)" p. 154. And further on (p. 155), he supports the judgment of an experienced listener who said that he "becomes more pessimistic about the Church the more he analyzes the sermons he hears." He said that they usually had one of two faults—"dry rot" or an irrelevant idealism. *The Gospel, The Church And The World.* Edited by K. S. Latourette (New York, 1946). Ch. VI, "The Limitations of the Church."

6. In *The Churchman* (January 1, 1947) he called attention to the fact that per-

As regards China, also, there is ignorance involved in the problems which concern Christian leadership. General Marshall, in his report to the President, confirmed the main situations which recent writers have tried to get before the American public, conditions which should engage Christians profoundly. Men tell us that the national government is hopelessly corrupt, yet our country has continued to support the Kuomintang. As a people, or as churches, we do not understand the economic revolution which is underway in Asia, not merely in China,[7] the implications of which, for our country and for the churches, are staggering. Consequently our attitude is one of apathy. As for the exploited, hungry peasants, still under the curse of the war lords, they are deciding that they have less hope for redress of their wrongs from us Christians of the West than from the Soviet Union. The general clamor in this country is against Communism, yet we do not demand for the exploited deliverance from landlord and capitalist. Lack of understanding and foresight about what is going on are the enemies overwhelming us in the Far East.

Professor Owen Lattimore, in his *Solution in Asia* (Boston, 1945), where he sees the crux of our problem, says: "At home, as abroad, we have the choice of attempting to facilitate change by an intelligent study of the evolution (of a democratic order abroad) or attempting to halt change entirely, in which case we shall build up the pressures that eventually break out in revolution" (p. 5). Contemporary events support his contention.

But, beyond this, our political and military leaders lack adequate understanding of the peoples with whom they are dealing. This is evident in the outmoded, unchivalrous way in which the Japanese surrender was received on board the *Missouri*.[8] We Christians claim to have an adequate philosophy of life and some knowledge of the cul-

tinent historical material, without which the statement could not be realistic, or anything but part truth, had been omitted. Dangerous but actual issues had been ignored. Professor Coe insisted that the churches' responsibility is to *both* Russia and the United States. He also said that the pronouncement lacked the use of basic Christian principles.

7. E.g., *Thunder Out of China*, late 1946, by T. H. White and A. Jacoby, p. xiii. Compare Dr. R. B. McClure, as quoted in *The Churchman* of June 1, 1947, on ruthless destruction of freedom by the Kuomintang (p. 22).

8. *Thunder Out of China*, pp. xi, xii.

tures of other peoples through the study of their religions, but this does not seem to have influenced the representatives of our government abroad; and some of our newsmen seem not to have been impressed by us either.[9]

The public is confused today by the kind of newspaper coverage and comment it gets. A good example may be found on page three of the *New York Times* for January 8, 1947, where, beside General Marshall's report, is a one-sided editorial comment *intended* to be a part truth. As with China so with Russia, the Church and the public at large are inadequately informed, and consequently are unable to evaluate what is being purveyed in the press, although it is a primary responsibility of the pulpit to be informed.

A factual report, like that of Edgar Snow's, is most disturbing. Referring to the influence of Russia in China, he says: "Yet few who have been in China during this decade, and conscious of the society in which they have lived, will dispute the contention that Marxism, the Russian Revolution, and the triumphs of the Soviet Union, are influences which have perhaps made more profound impressions upon the Chinese people than all Christian missionary influences in this period."[10]

One of the most serious aspects of this condition is the Christians' lack of the sense of obligation to acquaint themselves with the life and problems of other peoples, and the consequent lack of appreciation of their social and intellectual achievements. Out of such conditions no Christian leadership can arise. If it is contended that this is a large undertaking, the answer is that Christian discipleship is a stupendous responsibility.

Take India as another example. Most of the recent popular and semi-popular books on that country are shallow, fragmentary, and often inaccurate. Such publications seem to be adjusted to the mass

9. See review of two books (*One Last Look Around,* by Clark Lee, and *Star-Spangled Mikado: Japan Under American Occupation,* by Frank Kelley) in the New York *Herald-Tribune,* May 30, 1947. "But the high points of both books, which still leave the reader, himself a newspaper man by profession, faintly sick at the stomach, are the eye-witness accounts of the antics of the newspaper men when former Premier Tojo attempted to commit suicide." The account shows utter barbarism.

10. *Red Star Over China* (Modern Library Edition, 1944), p. 405.

ignorance of those upon whom the publishers depend for their market.[11]

This limited, traditional way in which we carry on appears also in the list of books, prepared by the American Commission of the World Council of Churches, to be sent abroad for the use of those whose libraries have been depleted by the war. *It undertakes to reflect Christian opinion in America during the contemporary period.* It probably does. Only seventeen out of the hundred and twenty-five titles deal with other parts of the world, and, of these, eight are by two authors. You cannot expect men not trained in inclusive world-ideas to express in any other way their choice of literature to be shared with other peoples. We are plainly suffering from a leadership feeding upon inadequate sources of supply for a dynamic spiritual life.

There is, also, on the part of the ministry a surprising lack of awareness of what is going on in the minds of the members of their own congregations. For one thing, they are not cognizant of the questions which men in the pews are raising. As one writer puts it: "What are the realities of the world as the church sees them? The layman's vision may be limited, but he sees that they cannot be expressed solely in terms of pieties and principles, for these can become as heavily encrusted with parasitic growths as a plant."[12]

It cannot be over emphasized that many laymen have grave concerns about the kind of church they are supporting, about both the significance of its emphases, and the areas of its neglect. On January 13th, 1945, Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. addressed a Protestant Council dinner, where he referred to the horrors let loose in the great war and spoke of millions of men, many of them without church affiliation, who, as combatants, exemplified in the most commonplace fashion unselfishness, generosity, loyalty and self-sacrifice, unconsciously reflecting Christ's spirit: "Theirs is fundamentally a religion of deeds; expressed in life, not in words." He then asked the following question:

11. Professor Lattimore puts the matter bluntly: "American lack of facility in Asiatic languages is a good gauge of the shallowness of American expert knowledge of Asia. . . . Many of the most influential books on the politics and even the history of Asia were written by men who could not read the source materials in the languages of the peoples whose affairs they authoritatively discussed" *(Op. cit.,* pp. 5, 7).

12. *The Church and the New World Mind* (Drake Lectures for 1944), "The Church, the Press, and World Opinion," by Willmott Lewis (p. 103).

In the presence of this great host of noble men and women, who, generally, have not come from the church, although directly, or indirectly, all have been more or less influenced by it. . . . What of the future of the Christian Church? Will these people . . . find in the church generally as it exists today the recognition, the association, the guidance and the inspiration that they need and have a right to expect? Regretfully we must answer, "No." . . . For the church has learned too little to speak their language, to think in terms of their environment, to meet their needs.

He insisted that although men crave the substance of religion, the churches often emphasize the form; that the Church must shift its emphasis from creed and ritual to living; that men want religious training, spiritual inspiration, in order that they may make wise decisions, having acquired both the knowledge and the will to do so.

Mr. Rockefeller's address brought the usual storm of criticism from those who caught his reference to creed and ritual but failed to understand what he was saying. Yet, as *The Churchman* of April 15, 1945 said: "Ninety-nine out of a hundred Christians know what Mr. Rockefeller meant and know that he was speaking the truth."

It may be noted that this large area of humanity to which Mr. Rockefeller refers is one that the Church seems loath to accept on its intrinsic worth, without some kind of ecclesiastical formula. Furthermore, there is in every culture, not merely in our own, such a host of men and women working against evil and for righteousness in the same devoted way. These the Christians must discover, for they are the greatest asset of religion today. Here, too, the churches are ignorant "both of their language and of their environment" and are unprepared for co-operation and brotherhood.

Somehow our leadership must discover a new scale of values and a new sense of opportunity. This will be a new awakening. Unfortunately, it is the limited appreciation of the opportunity and responsibility that faces Christianity that accounts for the reactions already at work (since the war) which makes possible now a reaffirmation of old shibboleths and old phraseologies in religion, just as in politics we use "democracy," in business "free enterprise," and generally and vaguely "the American way of life." Thus we swing back to the defence of the past and hurl the words "Communist," "Red," "disloyal to Christ," or "dangerous," at those who challenge the present order by speaking for the masses.

II

If the well-being of mankind is the paramount issue today, then Christian forces must take their place effectively by the side of all other available agencies, domestic and foreign, in behalf of all men.

Unfortunately, there are two outstanding reasons why Christians are not doing this: (1) their inability, as we have pointed out, to offer a united aggressive front of their own to world problems; and (2) their unwillingness to join themselves with other religions in behalf of a better world. The churches are interested in lesser matters, their own individual affairs;[13] ecclesiasticism and doctrine; some tradition or other; some theological teacher or other; some particular emphasis or other; some ritual detail. Our seminaries continue to teach narrow loyalties in doctrine and denominationalism. These secondary matters break up Christians into little isolated bodies both at home and abroad. To be sure, the churches have an organization which speaks for them, in a limited way, at home, but the denominations do not all move together, and the ministry does not speak with one voice on the great issues.

The same pattern distinguishes the "missionary" forces, even though there is an International Missionary Council. For years Christians in India have been working for a united church. Is all the difficulty in India?

Basically, there is no plan for an inter-religions organization, world-wide in scope, of which Christians would be a member. This idea is even regarded as "shocking."

From the standpoint of a missionary Christianity, this placing the churches in a separate category, separating them from all other religions and claiming superiority for them, with the assumption that God gives them special consideration, isolates the Christian body from the rest of the religious world and places Christians in a false position.

This isolation of the Christian community appears also in a kind of spiritual arrogance (if such a combination of words be permitted).

13. Professor John E. Bennett, in the chapter already noted (p. 142) says: "Several of the strongest and most progressive denominations are becoming more self-sufficient and more aggressive as denominations." And, in a recent article in *Christendom*, Professor Wolsley shows how this condition of divisiveness works: "The Protestant denominational newspapers and magazines are for the most part continuing to harden denominational lines, while in some ways the rest of the world is becoming united."

Everywhere the Old Testament and the Anglo-Saxon superman spirit is a baneful influence. The Church is plagued by it. The Christian talks of uniqueness and practices exclusiveness. This is a canker eating at the heart of the Church. It makes the Christian movement a force dividing a world that needs to be made one. It tries to enhance the significance of Christianity by devaluating the religious faiths and civilizations of other peoples.

A recent book, using Mr. Willkie's "One World," and offering one Gospel for it, exhibits this isolation in action. The author says, and taught in his church, that *consecutive* revelation began with Abraham, and, that with Jesus the revelational activity of God was exhausted. While admitting that God always has been and is speaking to men, this writer calls all these other communications, including those to such men as Laotze, the Buddha, Socrates, and Plato, "casual disclosures, lying outside the movement of his consecutive revelation." They were personal and incidental; they were not part of his supreme and consecutive revelation.[14]

But the world needs some sort of global solidarity in religion. This may look like an impossible ideal, some will say, in the face of what is going on in India, with Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh in open conflict. Yet we are in no position to criticize them, for, as a matter of fact, in our "Great Century" of Christian missions we have made no substantial contribution, if indeed any at all, toward religious peace and co-operation. Christians ought to commit themselves to a world Christianity, Chrisitianity in many forms; but it should take the further step also of relating itself to the other religious systems in some organic and effective way. All religions would profit thereby, and so would (and this is *the* important matter) the peoples of the world. This would not be a parliament of religions, but a federation of religious forces for peace and brotherhood among men. For, in the religions of the world there is much common ground which is not being utilized for this purpose by Christians or by any other of the faiths. And there is a great deal of religious experience in the lives of men of all faiths which would be of value, if it were discovered and conserved. A search for this should be substituted for the traditional comparative study of religions. The late Professor Arthur Christy's comment on a world political organiza-

14. *One Gospel For One World*, by Harold P. Sloan (New York, 1947), p. 10.

tion applies to religious forces as well, to Christians along with the rest: "Any structure it [democracy] might raise, however, will be but a house of cards if it is not cemented with knowledge of the interdependence of peoples and their contributions to the common heritage of mankind."[15]

All of this division fostered within Christianity and between Christianity and the non-Christian religions, becomes not only more and more of an absurdity, but also an increasing tragedy. However, this is not all. Christians are divided on economic, social, and racial lines, and these divisions appear within the denominations themselves. These are situations of the gravest concern to missionaries, since it is foolish to insist that we can carry a gospel of reconciliation and brotherhood abroad, while, at the same time, we allow present conditions within these areas at home.

One of the results of ignorance and of exclusiveness within our religion, with its circumscribing effects, is that, in the face of today's needs, many are finding their outlet for service in organizations which are filling the gaps that the churches are leaving open. Many "church people" of all denominations are joining with persons of other faiths in an outlet for their religious impulses in philanthropic bodies, many of which are of world-wide scope. Divisiveness, exclusiveness, and isolationism constitute a philosophy of religion which Christians must abandon.

III

This insistence upon a comprehensive acquaintance with the contemporary world, and upon an inclusive, rather than an exclusive, attitude towards others, requires on the part of the leadership of the churches a *new* kind of mind. No mere intensification of the old drives, with their limitations, will do. Better appreciation of men of other civilizations, promotion of world fellowship, and a co-operative relationship with other faiths on religious grounds, is the antithesis of the traditional outlook of Christianity. It is the basis, however, of a real missionary church capable of projecting a foreign mission. World effectiveness stems from global insights and relationships.

There is, then, the spiritual and mental temper of this whole prob-

15. *The Asian Legacy and American Life*, edited by Arthur E. Christy (New York, 1945). "The Sense of The Past," by the editor (p. 55).

lem of projecting Christianity at home and abroad. Traditionalism, lack of understanding of other peoples, arrogance, exclusiveness or isolation, circumscribed outlook on religion, and lethargy, are a temper of mind; they are not spiritual values. We must not forget about this divisive principle at work. The Moslem controversy has been carried on for thirteen centuries and is far from dead. The Christian quarrel with the Arya Samaj has gone on for decades. The old mind is still in command. Today other faiths are being pushed aside with a wave of the hand, so far as their importance for the Church is valued. The "either-or," the "this-or-nothing," imperialistic temper rules among people who shout about the democratic spirit of Christianity. All of this must be changed in the new birth. An enquiring mind, anxious to understand, for example, what the Buddha sought to do, trying to look into his mind, and to look out from within his system, sympathetic toward his beliefs and aspirations, courteous, acting as if he had (as indeed he did have) religious insight worthy of consideration and respect—all this would be a welcome asset to the Church. (There are, of course, many with such ideas, but they are viewed with suspicion by the rank and file, and by most leaders as well.) Buddhism, with its centuries of religious search, and with valid conclusions growing out of an age-long struggle with sorrow and evil, deserves something more than Christianity has conceded to it. The Buddha had a much more profound idea of the perfection of the soul than that commonly held by Christians. And who presumes to dismiss Nirvana with a sentence?

The new era calls for inter-religion mindedness. No longer are religions to be put side by side so as to see how all but one fail to meet the norm of the one.[16] For, while there are differences in outlook and con-

16. The need for a new mind may be illustrated by an excerpt from a program from a Park Avenue church (New York, December 17, 1944): "Here is a striking and illuminating comparison of the various religious faiths of the world:

> Greece said: 'Be moderate; know thyself.'
> Rome said: 'Be strong; order thyself.'
> Confucianism says: 'Be superior; correct thyself.'
> Buddhism says: 'Be disillusioned; annihilate thyself.'
> Hinduism says: 'Be separated; merge thyself.'
> Mohammedanism says: 'Be submissive; bend thyself.'
> Judaism says: 'Be holy; conform thyself.'
> Modern Materialism says: 'Be industrious; enjoy thyself.'
> Christianity says: 'Be Christlike; give thyself.'"

The fact that this formula has been used for years by a noted evangelist, merely increases its significance for this argument.

tent in the various faiths, still, religion itself is a larger area of reference than any one of them. Christians, however, have never really attempted to think in terms of other faiths—not even others of their own name (Christianity). But others have done so and are not ashamed of it. The Editor of the *Indian Social Reformer* wrote (February 2, 1925):

> No one who knows the facts will deny that modern Hinduism has in essential respects been profoundly vivified by its contacts with Christ's teaching. The impact of Christianity on Hindu thought is but faintly reflected in the Indian Christian community. Its largest manifestation is to be found in the unique way in which Hindu life and thought have been reacting to it. . . . India's familiarity with the Bible is not limited to forms and phrases. The book is being studied and searched for the spirit of Christ independently of the dogma of the Churches. The Bible has undoubtedly given a great stimulus to religious thought in India.

The immediate reaction to this is to say that because of our temper of mind we have not capitalized upon this aspect of Christian opportunity, the appropriation of the values in other faiths. "We still have to learn religion from Asia, both in terms of the living religions which are there, and in terms of Asiatic versions of Christianity."[17] More inclusively, Christians have neglected those profound elements in religious experience which other faiths possess. That is, we have not associated ourselves with them. On the other hand, this sort of universalism in religious experience is the basis for religious fellowship and forms the only adequate ground for missionary movements. This fact faces *all* religions.

Understanding and appropriation in inter-faith contacts are difficult to achieve. It is easy to assume that all other faiths are wrong and that ours must be accepted just as particular Christians explain it. It is far more difficult, but none the less imperative, that we discover what others mean by their faiths and what they have learned about religion. This is not the superficial quest which Christians so often assume that it is. This new temper of mind or attitude towards other faiths was expressed in Arthur E. Christy's remark: "The spiritual foundations upon which the world society of the future is to be built must consist of a knowledge of all the affinities which exist between peoples and the ways in which they complement each other."[18]

17. Professor W. E. Hocking, in *The Asian Legacy and American Life*, Essay, "Living Religions And a World Faith," p. 195.

18. *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

The mind with which the Church approaches this new era must be more than one of good will and sympathy, more than informed; it must acquire the urge for inquiry and for religious fellowship. As we have seen, the Church, for all its giving to missions, is not internationally-minded. Neither pulpit nor pew, in the by and large, are intellectually interested in their missionary world. Their enthusiasm arises rather from the stimulation of the appropriate emotions or from official pressure. We suffer from a mental and spiritual paralysis in our *attitude* towards peoples and their religions. If Christians are to share in the great world-upsurge for better living, they must identify themselves with those to whom they make their gifts. The Church must have a Christian conversion. It must turn away from its divisive activities and thinking.

One of the shocking discoveries that confronts us, as we look over the recent past, is that the abandonment, in even a small degree, of isolationism in the missionary outlook, even in the Protestant missions, began only a few years ago. The first world missionary conference was held in Edinburgh, in 1910; the *International Missionary Review* was begun in 1912; the second international missionary conference met in Jerusalem in 1928; the provision for research and council was inaugurated in 1929; the third international conference was held in Madras in 1938; and the fourth, this summer, in Whitby, Ontario. Unrest and dissatisfaction are seen in the deliberations of all these conferences, and the broadening results were weighed down by the drag of "conservative" opposition. The significance of the Edinburgh Conference in 1910 is that it set up a united front for Protestant foreign missions, and set on foot a series of projects for concerted action, organization, and intelligent advance on the part of the churches. The Conference at Jerusalem, in 1928, met growing demands for a more comprehensive missionary objective. Evangelism was interpreted to include economy, agriculture, and labor as affecting the Christian and the prospective members of the Church.

Between the second and third Conferences, the Laymen's Inquiry was launched, in 1930, and in 1932 *Re-Thinking Missions* was published. This report on the Inquiry dealt with fundamentals so incisively as to meet with wholesale attack, both in the field, especially in India, and at home. But attack did not obliterate the fact that foreign missions

were under serious criticism. It might be well to repeat here some of the things that the report emphasized:

> Ministry to the secular needs of men in the spirit of Christ . . . is evangelism in the highest sense of the word. . . . The time has come to set education and other philanthropic aspects of mission work free from organized responsibility to the work of conscious and direct evangelism. . . . We must . . . be willing, largely without any preaching, to co-operate wholeheartedly with non-Christian agencies for social improvement, and to foster the initiative of the Orient in defining the ways in which we shall be invited to help (p. 326).

As for the Christian's attitude towards other faiths:

> The mission of today should make a positive effort . . . to know and understand the religions around it, then to recognize and to associate itself with whatever kindred elements there are. It is . . . not the duty of the Christian missionary to attack the non-Christian systems of religion (pp. 326 f.).

For the International Missionary Conference held at Madras in 1938, careful preparation was made. Professor H. Kraemer, of the University of Leiden, was commissioned to write his book, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World,* for study preliminary to the meeting. In it he insisted that Christianity is a unique religion based upon a "Biblical realism," and "incommensurable" with other faiths. He took his stand on "the inherent incommensurableness of the religion of Biblical realism with all other specimens of religious life" (p. 83). For him, Christianity is a religion sui generis (e.g., p. 123), and all other religions, from the primitive to the highly philosophical, are natural (not revealed) religions. All religious experience, except the Christian, is relatively useless, except that the terms of other faiths may be of use to the missionary. "There is only one point of contact (between Christianity and other religions) . . . the disposition and attitude of the missionary" (p. 140).

This is, once more, a strictly dogmatic and isolationist position which, in the opinion of the present writer, leaves no reasonable ground for Christian foreign missions. Many at the Conference, both nationals and missionaries, took a radically different view from Dr. Kraemer, opposing the isolationist, radical replacement principle in mission strategy. The attempt to set up *a* theological interpretation of the meaning of Christianity failed. Moreover, the emphasis was placed upon the Kingdom of God rather than upon the Church. This involved a new attitude towards other faiths.

In 1940 *Living Religions and a World Faith* appeared, in which Professor W. E. Hocking dealt with the fallacy of radical replacement as a missionary aim, and criticized too limited interpretations of the meaning and significance of the Christian religion. Among other things, the Council meeting at Whitby restated objectives against the background of the war and its aftermath, affirming that "all the world" includes the domains of social, political, and cultural affairs. They also noted the growing racial tensions throughout the world, and recognized that the churches must meet assaults upon the integrity of personality where the point of attack, sooner or later, may prove to be upon the Christian conceptions of truth, justice, mercy, freedom, and love, and where the attacking forces may be governments, organized religious imperialisms, massed economic forces, the armies of technocracy, a powerful but sub-Christian press, the radio, or mass education. They were convinced that the propagation of the Gospel is not primarily the work of theologians, and that it must be carried on in the language of today and in terms of contemporary conditions covering all human relationships. All of these points will require stupendous effort and organization to bring them to the minds of the rank and file of the membership of the churches.

The references in this section point to an unrest in the churches, covering a long period of time, regarding missionary techniques and objectives. But without radical changes in thought, outlook, and action, new life and vigor cannot be hoped for. Rather, Christianity will remain in the world much as Jainism, for example, is in India today, static and inconsequential.

IV

The foregoing discussion points to an urgent need of reviewing the facilities for choosing and training leadership for the churches. The selection of candidates for the ministry must receive more attention. Qualities of spirit and of mind need careful scrutiny. Fluent use of religious terminology is not a sufficient qualification for the ministry. Professor John C. Bennett speaks (with regret) of the "very widespread spiritual and intellectual mediocrity in the leadership of the church."[19] The reason for this lies, in large part, in the careless selection of candidates. No business organization of large resources would use such

19. *The Gospel, The Church and The World,* Ch. VI, "The Limitations of the Church," p. 152.

haphazard methods in choosing specialized personnel as do the churches.

Then, the curriculum is very much in need of attention, for through it our leaders obtain their outlook and set of mind for their profession.

In 1945, the Northern Baptist Convention issued a report on theological education based upon a survey of its theological institutions.[20] With reference to theological studies they concluded that "basically it is a liberal arts curriculum with some trade school practices added" (p. 214). The report makes the point that the Baptist seminaries have failed to meet their responsibilities as *professional* schools, their real function.

It is my contention that the need for a reconstruction of the theological curriculum is church-wide, and that it must include a consideration of the criticisms brought out in this essay, as well as others which will follow.

There have been some additions to the curriculum in recent decades, but these have been really makeshifts, leaving the heart of the traditional theological course of study virtually untouched. One of the newer subjects is religious education. This has been added to make usable to ministers *in their professional careers* the advances made during recent years in psychology, in sociology, and in education; and likewise, the new and significant values of our heritage through history, the Bible, and theology.

Another makeshift concession to professional needs is the inclusion of social studies (which include or ought to include economics), thus making the social (and economic) emphases of the Bible a part of the minister's equipment.

Emphasis on *rural* problems has become necessary, since these are of special significance for large areas in our country, and indispensable for the missionary. In such countries as India the church problem is overwhelmingly in the villages. It includes the whole of village life; sanitation, health, occupation, education, recreation, community life, with the Christian group not as an isolated body, but as part of the whole village. This is the most neglected of all missionary activities. The poorest trained, poorest paid workers are in the villages. Supervision of these rural communities is of the hurried visit type.

20. *Theological Education in the Northern Baptist Convention*, 1945.

With these added subjects the danger is that they fall into the traditional pattern of the seminary and become mere post-graduate courses. In some instances this has happened.

The Northern Baptist Survey goes deeper, insisting upon an integrated curriculum. The committee says:

> The necessary changes in curriculum can not come about unless a whole theological faculty is willing to waive their several rights in fields of study as now conceived and pool all their resources in a fresh endeavor to discover what changes in their entering students need to be brought about and how these changes can be effected . . . (p. 217).

This lack of a co-ordinated presentation of the subject matter of the curriculum is, indeed, a major weakness in our seminaries. Integration of the curriculum means that each member of the faculty knows what all of his colleagues are trying to do, and that he has their combined judgment to guide him in presenting his own subject. The faculty must compare and correlate their data, so that each may see his relation to the total aim of ministerial training. This would eliminate the faculty competition for students.

Another prevalent weakness in the curriculum is the dogmatic presentation of the subject matter, a brand of theological opinion, or a denominational temper, pervading the school. What the Acting President of Columbia University said to entering students in his address on September 28, 1946, applies fully to the seminaries. He warned against "any slogan-decorated system of education," any method like that which has lately been defeated in its efforts "to produce some kind of ersatz being to displace individual freedom and dignity." It would be good, he said, if we could know that *"the idea of regimented minds had gone down to defeat* with our late enemies" (italics mine).[21]

The teacher must not be a sounding board; rather his function is to show the student how to use his mind, how to handle data, how to question and evaluate what he hears and reads; to supply him with the principles which will serve him as he faces the issues which confront religion today; to teach him how to find stimulus for his own thought in reading and in meeting opinion with which he disagrees; and how

21. As reported editorially in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of September 27, 1946.

to develop independence and humility in his own thinking. But the teacher is not called upon to make up the student's mind for him. Practicing this function of indoctrinization is the greatest disservice which theological institutions are performing for their students today. Orthodoxy, in its accepted sense, simply stands in the way of Christianity's performing the functions of a world religion either at home or abroad.

It is of interest to note how theological studies in the mission field follow the traditional pattern of the West. The Rev. C. W. Ransom completed a survey of theological education in India for the Indian Christian Council and published it in 1945.[22] He found that "education of the ordained ministry represents one of the weakest points in the whole Christian enterprise in India" (p. 111), and he characterized the *core* of theological education, *the main branches of theology*, as Doctrine, Church History, Old Testament, and New Testament. This "Quartette," as he terms it, he admits still stands. A little has been done in the way of extra subjects on the edges of the established core, but not much; and change is now practically at a standstill.

Let us now consider in what way the theological curriculum should be overhauled and rejuvenated. To a considerable degree this has been suggested already; and what has been said about Religious Education, Christian Sociology, and Rural Studies indicates that *every* department must assume some of the responsibilities which these three are carrying under so many handicaps.

The teachings of the Old and New Testaments must shift from supporting an orthodoxy or the theological position of some denomination or institution. Historical commentary is but one clue to the meaning of the scriptures. It was a great day when scholars related the various books of the Bible to the times in which they were composed. But those times are long past. The messages of the law givers and prophets must be related to our day, to the issue of man's neighborly treatment of his fellow men. "This represented a new and untried technique in the days of Jesus, and it does pretty much still."[23] The message of Jesus must be released from provincial and sectarian limitations. "The Golden Rule . . . made no distinction between the Christian and the

22. *The Christian Minister in India* (Madras, 1945).

23. *Religion Faces the World Crisis*, by Professor Leroy Waterman (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1943), p. 144.

world, between Christian and heathen, between those in the ark of safety and those floundering in the depths."[24]

In the introduction to its study of Christianity and the economic order, *Information Service* includes these basic assumptions:

(1) The Christian ethic, derived from the Old and New Testaments . . . is of unlimited scope and applicable to all areas of human relationships. In every situation calling for choice and decision it is incumbent upon a Christian to ask, "What does duty prescribe?"
(2) In no area of human relationships have we attained to a truly Christian standard of life. *There is no Christian society* (italics are mine).
(3) It is a responsibility of the Christian community to seek continually to create social conditions under which it will be less difficult to express in daily living the spirit of redemptive love that is enshrined in the New Testament. This means that the principles of the Christian gospel are to be applied to the structure of social relations, to the organization of society, no less than to personal relations of human beings.
(4) Economic status and economic relationships are of basic importance. . . . They are fundamental in shaping the quality of life.[25]

Like biblical studies, theology and ethics must also abandon *formal* disciplines as a primary end. This is not to belittle these as fields of study, or to say that the Christian leader does not need to have a philosophy of religion of his own, but rather to insist upon the *function* of these subjects in the training of the minister. The student should be taught how men have handled theological theory, so as to be able to appraise the expressions of it which he encounters, but not so as to insist upon some particular system as *the* orthodox position or *the only way*. A man's theological opinion must not spoil him for religious fellowship and Christian service.

Ethical studies must make men alert to great issues as they arise; they must furnish insights for exposing unworthy causes, for showing up dubious schemes for what they are, and attacking all efforts to narrow men's opportunities. And sociology must function in the same way to prepare ministers for their tasks. Ethics and sociology should be inseparable companions.[26] But the churches are not insisting that the

24. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

25. February 23, 1946 (Published by the Department of Research and Education, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America).

26. E.g., The effort to exclude messenger boys from the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in favor of Western

function of capital is not merely to maintain itself, or that it does not exist for its "owner" alone, but is rather a trust to hold and to use for better human living. Here the minister is not a controversialist but a counselor. There is no clear, effective pronouncement, with all the churches behind it, broad and statesmanlike, in Christian terms, on behalf of the great masses of men, on the obligations and opportunities of wealth.

On the international side there are momentous ethical questions on which the minister needs to be similarly alert and well informed. Among these are race and economy in South Africa, indentured labor in Trinidad and elsewhere, landlordism in China and land tenure in India, scavanger caste occupations in India, and exploited children in China and India. These conditions, wherever they may exist, impair the spiritual health of our domestic Christianity. Then, there is no greater challenge to the churches (and to our country) than the concept of international trade designed to raise the living standards of underprivileged peoples. This requires a specially informed and trained leadership, if the churches are to become a saving influence in this world undertaking.

We cannot emphasize too much that international and domestic responsibilities in economics tie in together. "We must invisage a long planned program of social leadership in the world. . . . Economic life is a social process or a segment of a total social process. It can not be adequately considered apart from the issues of race, religion, education and all the complex human relationships that make up what we call national 'cultures' or 'civilizations' as a whole,"[27] writes Mr. Nourse, Vice-President of the Brookings Institution. He then asks: "When we export capital, are we going to demand exploitive terms?"[28]

Union, is an issue in Christian ethics and sociology. Miss Lenroot pointed out before the House Labor Committee that "the Western Union Telegraph Company is probably the largest single employer of children under sixteen in this country. On March 31, 1943, eleven per cent of the messengers employed by Western Union were reported to be under sixteen years of age" (*The American Child,* December, 1945). Another effort of the same sort is being made to keep newsboys at work, on the ground that selling papers is a famous way to wealth and success (*Ibid.,* December, 1946. A note on the new magazine, *Young Man—His Opportunity Magazine.*)

27. *World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations.* Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. "America's Responsibility in the Postwar International Field," by Edwin G. Nourse, pp. 107, 110.

28. *Ibid.,* p. 114.

In this question the Christian is put on the spot, for the greatness of his courage at home is the measure of his fitness to go abroad.

In all this the economic issue appears as the greatest and most far reaching of these facing the churches today. There is no limit to responsibility in this matter. As an illustration of the ramifications of this problem, take the question of church building. One of the great denominations predicts that it will spend $100,000,000 in *new* structures across this nation during the era of "new strategy" in church building. This raises serious questions for Christians. Will this program enter areas where there are already church buildings? Will it continue the practice of segregation of races in church buildings? Will it foster "the-churches-on-both-corners" situation? Other equally pertinent questions may be raised. The minister needs instruction about the relation of spending money to the advancement of Christian brotherhood. To say that a large part of this money will be spent locally to replace and enlarge existing plants increases the minister's responsibility and does not erase the Christian ethic involved in the use of money. In a Pennsylvania city, last winter, the writer was reminded that it is a "very religious" city, "a city of churches." But there is more to Christian narrowness even than this. Churches cater to special classes. One of those churches is a "white collar" church. What does "Home Missions" in the seminary set up as the minister's problem in the handling and use of church building funds and building? This, while involving Christian fidelity, is but a mere drop in the bucket of national and international responsibility in spending by churches and church agencies.

Church History is another subject needing attention. The Christian movement has always been a phenomenon within a complex whole of religious, philosophical, social, and political influences, and it owes its present character to many and diverse elements: the religions of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, India, Persia, Africa, Greece and Rome, North European paganism. These are but the barest references to sources of our present Christianity. Our religion does not begin with Jesus, nor does it end with him. We have not yet shuffled off prejudices that go back to Old Testament times, some of which Jesus pointed out. History should be handled to show the student how cultural forces interact, and how our religion became what it is. In this way other cul-

tures, other systems of thought, other religious teachings become sources from which Christians, like others, have drawn life, and character. Consequently, church history, no more than Old Testament and New Testament studies, can be used to bolster a theological position or to create that phantom, a religion that grew all by itself.

The place of the study of religions in the curriculum needs special attention, not only because of the Christian's hereditary antipathy towards the non-Christian systems, but also because of the intrinsic worth of other faiths. Like economics and social studies, knowledge of religions may be made a most useful means of brotherhood and fellowship. As Professor Hocking says: "The possibilities of relationships between Christianity and the other religions are far richer than the simple one of hostile exclusiveness, with its exhiliration and its appeal to the love of clear-cut-ness."[29] Indeed, understanding other religions is imperative, for, as General Eisenhower remarked recently: "If we are going to promote good will and understanding and moral regeneration, one thing that we must have is a determination to find out what other people are."[30]

Mr. Ransom remarked that one of the weakest spots in the preparation of the Indian theological student is his lack of knowledge of the non-Christian religions. This would, of course, include those of his own land. Here, as elsewhere, the preparation of the missionary is reflected. To him, too often, his "orthodoxy" is more important than his knowledge of his chosen people's religion. There is in India now a school of Islamic studies for missionaries and Indians, and one is being organized for the study of Hinduism. The essential thing in these schools is the attitude of mind of the faculty, for even a scholar may not be committed to brotherhood.

In a sense more needs to be done with this part of the curriculum than with any other, because of the way in which the non-Christian religions have been studied and taught. The Christian must accept peoples of other faiths as his equals and of equal significance to God. He then must explore the non-Christian faiths to discover what insights have been vouchsafed to them, distinctive in the same sense that he claims uniqueness for his own. As Professor Hocking says:

29. *Living Religions and a World Faith* (New York, 1940), p. 175.
30. *The Churchman,* Annual Dinner Award, December 3, 1946.

There is a spiritual life of Asia which has not alone to be conserved but to be learned from. There can be only one situation in which two religions in contact have no occasion for synthesis, namely, when one of the two contains all that the other has, and something over. This is certainly not the case in any Asiatic contact. Hence, I venture to propose that no *religion can become a religion for Asia which does not fuse the spiritual genius of Asia with that of Western Christianity;* and not alone the genius of Asia, but that of its major great religions.[31]

Isolation is more than a blunder; it is spelling defeat for Christianity.

Finally, a place must be found in the theological curriculum for anthropology, because of the contributions which this science has to make to every other department of study.

Besides the modifications in the theological curriculum so far discussed, which are equally significant for the minister remaining at home and for the one going abroad, there must be further special preparation for the missionary, since he faces an unfamiliar civilization. The further study of some specialized field would also be a good investment for the person who remains at home, if he aims at the broadest leadership. But for the missionary, not less than two years should be devoted to particular study of his appointed country. Primarily, he must get control of the "classical" language of his field. For India, this would be Sanskrit, and, in some cases, Arabic and Persian as well. This will introduce him to Indian religious and philosophical terms and make him familiar with Indian thought processes also. The study of the vernacular can be put off until he reaches the field. Then he will have the benefit of *hearing* what he is learning and will be saved from poor pronunciation. At the same time, he will have the best medium for getting acquainted with his people—learning *them* along with their language. To this must be added substantial courses in the literature, philosophy, religions, and history of his field. Further, there must be basic courses in anthropology and special studies from this point of view of the cultural aspects of the country to which he is going.

To put off special studies of the kind suggested until his first or second furlough is to waste both the missionary's time and his usefulness. His first term of service will be much richer if it has this background of preparation. But more attention should also be given to the studies

31. *Op. cit.*, p. 185.

of missionaries on furlough. An advanced degree should be the aim of continued study *only* when such specialization contributes to the individual's missionary aim. Consequently, collateral and secondary studies must not be chosen simply to meet degree requirements.

The Church will continue to lose ground both in the domestic and in the foreign areas of its work as long as it neglects a more careful selection of its leaders and fails to give serious attention to the preparation of its ministers for service in this contemporary world. Our churches here and overseas are just as badly in need of a world mind as our theological schools. If we continue to teach men the old phraseologies and techniques and to put "safe" men into the places of leadership, we cannot expect to recover our lost position either at home or abroad.

THE WIND BLOWETH WHERE IT LISTETH*

JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Hoober Professor of Comparative Religion, Yale University

A FORCE, POTENT, PERSISTENT AND PERSUASIVE, is operating on the "mission" fields—we call them such by custom, meaning now no offence nor derogation to those included immediately within them. It may not yield as readily to definition as to description such as has already been attempted in the abstract. It should be made to yield, however, to concrete description, and this will be attempted with particular attention to the greatest of all the mission fields, the land we have known as "India."

The force is operating in several cardinal directions, but the ultimate effect, in a sense, will be two-fold: (1) upon the character and constitution of the Church abroad, and (2) upon the comprehension of the Church at home, upon that portion of it, in particular, which has been committed to and has supported missions. These two effects may be quite distinct eventually, especially if the missionary enterprise undergoes a radical and thorough reformation. The force that is operating bids fair to bring about just such a reformation. We should like to be persuaded rather than compelled to yield to it, for the end of persuasion will be, doubtless, satisfaction, whereas compulsion may be destructive of wholesome values and may leave us cast down, if not embittered. There is no escape, however, from the force's operation, it is too persistent and too powerful. But an intelligent accommodation to it must bring it into positive and adequate control—if it is to be controlled. Have you never noticed how the skilful master accommodates his straining vessel to a raging storm, knowing that there is nothing else to do but to keep going!

The force is not sectarian, nor doctrinal, in a former or primarily occidental sense; it is not directly economic, although that factor is inevitably involved; it is immediately political. Such is its present potency, and the foreign associations and groups of Christians can do no less than recognize it in this character. The missionary churches must

* The author has recently returned from a long visit to India, during which he expounded the theory of this article among Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians, and worshiped as a Christian in mosques, gurdwaras, shrines—and churches.

be Indian, their members patriotic and loyal to the interests of an independent state. This contingency—call it such, to say the least—has placed the Indian Christian in a trying situation and has vitally affected the evangelism of the Church. The individual member must not only be above suspicion among the nationalists in general, he is sometimes torn betwixt contending parties, as between the Congress and the League, with the prospect of no slight embarrassment if he allies himself with the minority. If in any one locality the Muslims are the minor party, they can stand their ground and have support from Muslims elsewhere who constitute the majority. Hindus are in a similar position. But Christians have no such influential outside aid at their disposal, unless they are involved in an international "situation"—and such they must not depend upon. The missionary, indeed, may be the subject of a foreign power—and so compelled to keep aloof from politics, but the Indian is directly subject to his obligations to his motherland.

The effect on the evangelism of the Church is marked by a cessation of conversion. The non-Christian does not wish to run the risk of alien partnership by becoming a convert to the Christian Church, which has seemed to be, if it was not actually, a foreign institution. Not only does this circumstance bring up the issue, but it offers the Church at home an inescapable occasion to reconsider the whole problem of the "convert." If conversion is at an end in India—and many Indian Christian leaders say it is—the majority of the missionary-minded folk among the membership at home will think the chief objective of the enterprise has vanished! If conversion should be resumed in years to come, it will be inevitably something different psychologically—and maybe doctrinally, also—from what it was before, meanwhile, politics determining somewhat the status of the convert. And meanwhile the Church at home—not only the proponents of missions, but the opponents, also—may so alter its own attitude that an altogether new objective is established. Indeed, the force of which we write is working now in that direction. It would be remarkable and most laudable if the Church as such and as a whole would learn a way of assent to a worldwide Christian movement (let the reader not at once assume any organization now existing, not even a World Council of Churches, but look for something more extensively religious as well as Christian) which could and would enlist the best resources of all peoples and of

all religions toward the further permanent progress of mankind. This would mean conversion, not by transfer but by far-sighted and sincere accommodation, and it would enlist the moral interest of the Church as well as find support throughout the world. The force would persuade mankind toward such an end, or else destroy large areas of religion, if not to teach men to disrespect it altogether for its devotion to what is all too formal and its indifference to matters of the divine spirit.

India is expecting the ultimate, if not immediate, withdrawal of foreign officers of government, herself to decide whether any such should be invited to remain in service. It is proposed that the whole Indian situation be reviewed, not only political but also industrial, financial, commercial, and so on, allowing common and international interests to work out future, acceptable agreements. Something similar is expected by the Indian Church with regard to foreign missionaries and every agency of outside control. And the very expectation involves a process of thoroughgoing readjustment. Politics is bringing this about, control being the first consideration, but with provision for economic and religious reformation under the Indian Christians' own direction. At the moment, religion—no one religion in particular, but all of them together—is in India a secondary or even a tertiary consideration. The adherents themselves of the various religions, even Indian Muslims, have given politics first place. What this may do eventually to Muslim, Hindu, and other non-Christian Indian faiths we need not here attempt to say. We want to have a share as Christians, however, in such a reconstruction of religion that it will occupy first place in Indian minds, hearts, and worship. And the first step in that direction is our own—if we may be persuaded. We may not say to the force that is now operating, "almost thou persuadest me," unless we want to give the case away.

This force, then, which is "immediately" political, is more than politics and more than economics when reduced to adequate control; and of such control we now attempt to write. We have said already that this force is not "as formerly" sectarian or doctrinal. It bids fair to transform into something worthier and more substantial whatsoever dogma or ecclesiasticism may yield to it, but it will not rob any person or any faith of his or its genuine prerogatives. In fact, it must, in the

very nature of the case, employ them, and that in concrete fashion, while it fits them into the larger religious scheme of things. Let this be illustrated in preparation for a summary of the case.

For example, the Christian—the missionary-minded Christian, in particular—must understand that Hinduism is more than, and something other than, sheer "heathenism." This would mean a very different point of view from that with which modern missions started. And it would likewise be seen that the religion, namely Buddhism, which she gave to Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia in one form, and to China and Japan in yet another form, was not sheer heathenism. Recall, if you will, the classification of the religions of the world with which missions started not so long ago: (1) the Christian, entirely unique, the one "revealed" religion, possessed of the one "inspired" Scripture, offering the world its one Way of Salvation through the one Savior and Redeemer, and commissioned to bring the whole world into one fold under a given Name; (2) the Jewish and the Muslim, two communities of "deists" bound together by fraternal ties, and somehow related to Christianity through its Semitic heritage, although guilty of rejecting Jesus Christ; and (3) the "heathen" (an early English term to match the earlier Latin "pagan") who made up the balance of the world which confessedly was not well known to western Christians. Here was a judgment expressed without sufficient knowledge, and some ultimate embarrassment was inevitable, as Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucianists, for example, became better known.

Meanwhile missions got under way, the Jews and the Muslims remaining, of course, unimpressed; in fact, like Alexander the coppersmith, they have "greatly withstood" the spread of the Christian Gospel. The converts came from among the "heathen," who were variously known as Hindus, Buddhists, Confucianists, and Animists, when they might have been more appropriately and precisely called Indians, Burmese, Chinese, Japanese, or by some such geographical or racial designation, for very few of the conversions came out of those religions, strictly speaking. The "outcastes" of India are not Hindus, save by the loosest of connections—and most of the converts came from these and low-caste "Hindu" stocks. In China, Confucianism was a matter chiefly of the aristocracy, and even so was hardly a "religion," certainly *not* a religion in any Latin sense—whence the term—or with such a content

as the Hindu *dharma* holds (and, of course, with no such elements as distinguish the Semitic equivalents of "religion"). The ordinary Chinese was then, if not an "animist," somewhat indiscriminately a follower of "three teachings" *(chiao),* the Confucianist, the Buddhist, and the Taoist. The converts in all these areas were generally by no means learned persons, and the Christianity they learned was usually by rote. Very often some preferment, some social or economic benefit, was expected by them through conversion—the term "rice Christians" has had some factual foundation (and it may be remarked that there will be no more of these).

In other words, the Christian mission has not won many members of the higher orders, however remarkable its work has been with others lower. It has not altered the essential character of any other great religion, nor has it made many converts among the brahmans, the scholars, and the monks themselves who represent conspicuously the Hindu, the Confucian, and the Buddhist orders. On the contrary—and herein the force displays itself in terms purely *religious*—these orders have been studied thoroughly by many Christians who have found among them priceless values. There is, indeed, a Christian theory that God has nowhere left himself without a witness (Acts 17:26), and has, perhaps, provided for divisions among men! The Buddhist emperor, Asoka, proclaimed by his Rock Edict No. XII the folly of a man's condemning the sects of others altogether by reason of devotion to his own, and the wisdom of all sects' knowledge of each others' ways and doctrines, which would be provocative of harmony among them; urged, nevertheless, a man's promotion of his own sect, while at the same time he glorifies and expounds (cf. *dipanam,* "exposition") the very essence of Dhamma (*Skt* and *Hindi dharma*), what is natural, virtuous, and the like. Confucianism, "the scholar's teaching," has placed remarkable emphasis upon *ren,* or "virtue," and has analyzed it into the full round of moral qualities, with sincerity perhaps the chief of all. *Ren* is perfect virtue to the Chinese. And the *areté* of the Christian apostle, Paul, represents substantially the same.

Nor is there need (perhaps no space!) to cite just now certain similarities of doctrine, of theology, of ritual and of philosophy, in many of these great religions—not excepting Christianity. And Buddhism, like Christianity—and Islam—has been very "missionary," although

only Christianity and Islam have held commissions to make all of the world's religions one (cf. Qur'an, Sura 8:40), in both cases by a given creed and formula. There are, on the contrary, too many differences among the great religions—at least too much emphasis on difference! A sympathetic, religious-minded scholar has recently observed that "in the long history of mankind, religion has been on the whole a divisive rather than a unifying force," and that religion as a whole "has been weakened by its fragmentation." This is, of course, a statement of bare fact, incontestible. But listen once again to the kindly Asoka's sound advice. Mutual understanding and sympathic co-operation can enlist the great religions and all their subdivisions in an attitude and in efforts toward the common good. And our interpretation of the Christian Gospel is that it presented on its own initiative, together with more adequate provision for it, what Asoka recommended, what the Chinese seeks in his quest of virtue, and what Hinduism has suggested in its *Upanishads* and *Gītā*.

If now we try to summarize the case, we may observe at once that the problem of the final status of all the world's religions and of their relationship to one another still awaits solution, and that a force is somehow working toward that end. The religions must recognize this and work together on the solution. The Muslims, also, for that matter once considered Hindus "heathen" (*mushrikin,* or "those who associated" other gods with God), without knowing much about them until they had conquered India. They have had occasion to correct and to expand their point of view, and it can be shown that this is possible and proper without disloyalty to their own religion. Not only must all the great religions work together, but each one also must be loyal to itself as a basis of association. There could be a world council of religions, not suggestive of or representing syncretism, or a superficial, sentimental ideology, or anything merely theosophical—such extremes are really less commendable and valid than sectarian zeal and they produce less tangible results. There is no need of any compromise that destroys sincere, concrete convictions on the part of educated men, and co-operation in religion must be learned by education, whereas sectarian hostility has been learned by "revelation." In the providence of God, "God-fearing" men, earnest, able, intelligent, and devoted followers of the great religions, can find, if they will, a ground of mutual

confidence and enterprise that is bound to yield at large the common good. Humanity is not to be reduced to any single pattern, development and progress having come about by variation. The proper man will "first to his own self be true" and, at the same time, know that "you must get at a man through his own religion and not through yours." Somehow, if a man is true to himself at first—and he need never be false to himself—and sees himself justly in the total situation, he cannot mistrust or mistreat another man who seeks likewise to preserve his own identity and his own integrity.

If Jews, Protestants, and Catholics can some day reach accord, as many continually are hoping; if Moses, Jeremiah, Maimonides, Peter, Paul, Calvin, Luther, and Aquinas can endure in one ageless tradition; then also can Mencius, Mo-ti, Chu Hsi, Buddha, Asoka, Kobo Daishi, Shankara, Ramanuja, Nanak, Muhammad, al-Ghazali, and Jesus Christ himself be reconciled to one another and united in immortal man's religious memory and prospect. Men will supplement world-history with a timeless ideology, preserving both, for history itself alone has been divisive. Each man will cherish what there is of final worth in his own inheritance, but will assume likewise the office of ambassador, an ambassador of reconciliation among the world's religions, recommending even by his own example everywhere the general practice of "whatsoever things are true, to be revered, just, pure, lovely and gracious." No cultural continuity need be unwisely broken, and all religions may be missionary in a co-operative way, letting men express themselves spontaneously in any matters of conversion. This is self-expression in the highest meaning of the force which is at work, and men may find themselves as sons of God by yielding to its power. The Christian, in particular, can lose himself and find himself by becoming all things to all men and by activity directed toward doing good, after the example of Jesus and the great apostle.

WHO IS "SATAN" AND WHERE IS "HELL"?

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Massachusetts

"He that doeth sin is of the Devil" (I John 3: 8).

THAT IN THIS DAY AND AGE, when "for most people religion has become an archaic and impossible refuge,"[1] men no longer take either God or Satan seriously, arises from the fact that they have come to think of both alike only objectively, only as persons external to themselves and for whose existence no adequate proof can be found. The same, of course, applies to the notions of their respective realms, heaven and hell, thought of as times and places neither now nor here.

We have, in fact, ourselves postponed the "kingdom of heaven on earth" by thinking of it as a material Utopia to be realised, we fondly hope, by means of one or more five-year plans, overlooking the fact that the concept of an endless progress is that of a pursuit "in which thou must sweat eternally,"[2]—a phrase suggestive less of heaven than of hell. What this really means is that we have chosen to substitute a present hell for a future heaven we shall never know.

The doctrine to be faced, however, is that "the kingdom of heaven is within you," here and now, and that, as Jacob Boehme, amongst others, so often said, "heaven and hell are everywhere, being universally extended. . . . Thou art accordingly in heaven or hell. . . . The soul hath heaven or hell within itself,"[3] and cannot be said to "go to" either when the body dies. Here, perhaps, the solution of the problem of Satan may be sought.

It has been recognized that the notion of a Satanic "person," the chief of many "fallen Angels," presents some difficulties: even in religion, that of a Manichean "dualism" emerges; at the same time, if it be maintained that anything whatever is not God, God's infinity is thereby circumscribed and limited. Is "he," Satan, then a person, or

1. Margaret Marshall, in *The Nation*, February 2, 1946.

2. Jacob Boehme, *De incarnatione Verbi*, 2.5.18.

3. *Idem*, *Dialogues*, "The Supersensual Life," and "Of Heaven and Hell" and "A Discourse . . ." Everyman's Library Edition, especially pp. 259, 260, but all should be read.

merely a "personification," i.e., postulated personality?[4] Who is "he," and where? Is he a serpent or a dragon, or has he horns and a poisonous tail? Can he be redeemed and regenerated, as Origen and the Muslims have believed? All these problems hang together.

However the ultimate truth of "dualism" may be repudiated, a kind of dualism is logically unavoidable for all practical purposes, because any world in time and space, or that could be described in words or by mathematical symbols, must be one of contraries, both quantitative and qualitative, for example, long and short, good and evil; and even if it could be otherwise, a world without these opposites would be one from which all possibility of choice, and of procedure from potentiality to act, would be excluded, not a world that could be inhabited by human beings such as we. For anyone who holds that "God made the world," the question, Why did He permit the existence in it of any evil, or that of the Evil One in whom all evil is personified, is altogether meaningless; one might as well enquire why He did not make a world without dimensions or one without temporal succession.

Our whole metaphysical tradition, Christian and other, maintains that "there are two in us,"[5] this man and the Man in this man; and that this is so is still a part and parcel of our spoken language in which, for example, the expression "self-control" implies that there is one that controls and another subject to control, for we know that "nothing acts upon itself,"[6] though we forget it when we talk about

4. "Person cannot be affirmed . . . of living things . . . bereft of intellect and reason . . . but we say there is a person of a man, of God, of an Angel" (Boethius, *Contra Evtychen*, 2). On this basis, Satan, who remains an Angel even in Hell, can be called a Person, or indeed, Persons, since his name is "Legion: for we are many"; but as a fallen being, "out of his right mind," in reality a Person only potentially. Much the same could be said of the soul, viz., that there is a Person of the soul, but hardly that the soul, as it is in itself, is a Person. Satan and the soul, both alike invisible, are only "known," or rather "inferred," from behavior, which is just what "personality" implies: "personality, that is the hypothetical unity that one postulates to account for the doings of people" (H. S. Sullivan, "Introduction to the Study of Interpersonal Relations," *Psychiatry*, 1, 1938).

5. Plato, *Republic* 439 D, E, 604 B; Philo, *Det.* 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* II, II, 26.4; St. Paul, II *Cor.* 4:16; and in general, as the doctrine is briefly stated by Goethe: "Zwei Seelen wohnen ach, in meiner Brust, die eine will sich von der andern trennen" (*Faust*, I, 759). Similarly in the Vedanta, Buddhism, Islam, and in China.

6. *Nil agit in seipsum:* axiomatic in Platonic, Christian and Indian philosophy:

"self-government."[7] Of these two "selves," outer and inner man, psycho-physical "personality" and very Person, the human composite of body, soul, and spirit is built up. Of these two, on the one hand body-and-soul (or-mind), and on the other, spirit, one is mutable and mortal, the other constant and immortal; one "becomes," the other "is," and the existence of the one that is not, but becomes, is precisely a "personification" or "postulation," since we cannot say of anything that never remains the same that "it *is*." And however necessary it may be to say "I" and "mine" for the practical purposes of everyday life, our Ego in fact is nothing but a name for what is really only a sequence of observed behaviors.[8]

Body, soul, and spirit: can one or other of these be equated with the Devil? Not the body, certainly, for the body in itself is neither good nor evil, but only an instrument or means to good or evil. Nor the Spirit—intellect, synteresis, conscience, Agathos Daimon—for this is, by hypothesis, man's best and most divine part, in itself incapable of error, and our only means of participation in the life and the perfection that is God himself. There remains only the "soul"; that soul which all must "hate" who would be Christ's disciples and which, as St. Paul reminds us, the Word of God like a two-edged sword "severs from the spirit"; a soul which St. Paul must have "lost" to be able to say truly that "I live, yet not *I*, but Christ in me," announcing, like Maṇsūr, his own theosis.

Of the two in us, one the "spark" of Intellect or Spirit, and the other, Feeling or Mentality, subject to persuasion, it is obvious that the latter is the "tempter," or more truly "temptress." There is in each of us, in this man and that woman alike, an *anima* and *animus*, relatively feminine and masculine;[9] and, as Adam rightly said, "the

"the same thing can never do or suffer opposites in the same respect or in relation to the same thing at the same time," Plato, *Republic*, 436 B; "strictly speaking, no one imposes a law upon his own actions," St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* 1.93.5; "because of the antinomy involved in the notion of acting upon oneself" *(svātmani ca kriyāvirodhāt)*, Śankara on *BG* 2.17.

7. "Art thou free of self? then art thou 'Self-governed' " *(selbes gewaltic* = Skr. *svarāṭ)*, Meister Eckhart (Pfeiffer) p. 598.

8. "How can that which is never in the same state 'be' anything?" (Plato, *Cratylus*, 439 E: *Theaetetus*, 152 D; *Symposium*, 207 D, etc.) " 'Ego' has no real meaning, because it is perceived only for an instant," i.e., does not last for even so long as two consecutive moments *(naivāham-arthaḥ kṣaṇikatva-darśanāt, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, 293).

9. It is unfortunate that, in modern psychology, an originally lucid terminology

woman gave, and I did eat"; also, be it noted, the "serpent," by whom the woman herself was first beguiled, wears, in art, a woman's face. But to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding here, it must be emphasized that all this has nothing whatever to do with a supposed inferiority of women or superiority of men: in this functional and psychological sense any given woman may be "manly" (heroic) or any given man "effeminate" (cowardly).[10]

One knows, of course, that "soul," like "self," is an ambiguous term, and that, in some contexts, it may denote the Spirit or "Soul *of* the soul," or "Self *of* the self," both of which are expressions in common use. But we are speaking here of the mutable "soul" as distinguished from the "spirit," and should not overlook to what extent this *nefesh*, the *anima* after which the human and other "animals" are so called, is constantly disparaged in the Bible,[11] as is the corresponding *nafs* in

and distinction has been confused by an equation of the "soul-image" with "the *anima* in man, the *animus* in woman." The terms are even more misused by Father D'Arcy in his *Mind and Heart of Love*, ch. 7. Traditionally, *anima* and *animus* are the "soul" and the "spirit" equally in any man or any woman; so William of Thierry (cf. note 22 below) speaks of *animus vel spiritus*. This usage goes back to Cicero, e.g. *Tusc.* I. 22. 52, Neque nos corpora sumus. Cum igitur *nosce te* dicit, hoc dicit, *nosce animum tuum*, and V.13.38, humanus animus decerptus est ex mente divina; and Accidius (*trag.* 296), sapimus animo. fruimur anima; sine animo, anima est debilis.

10. In all traditions, not excepting the Buddhist, this man and this woman are both equally capable of "fighting the good fight."

11. Cf. D. B. Macdonald, *Hebrew Philosophical Genius* (p. 139), "the lower, physical nature, the appetites, the psyche of St. Paul . . . 'self,' but always with that lower meaning behind it"; Grimm, *Greek-English Lexikon of the New Testament*, s.v. ψυχικός ("governed by the sensuous nature subject to appetite and passion"); "anima . . . cujus vel pulchritudo virtus, vel deformitas vitium est . . . mutabilis est" (St. Augustine, *De gen. ad litt.* 7.6.9, and *Ep.* 166.2.3).

On the other hand, the "Soul" or "Self" as printed with the capital is Jung's "Self . . . around which it [the Ego] revolves, very much as the earth rotates about the sun . . . [its] superordinated subject" *(Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, p. 268): not *a* being, but the inconnumerable and indefinable "Being of all beings."

We are never told that the mutable soul is immortal in the same timeless way that God is immortal, but only that it is immortal "in a certain way of its own" (*secundum quemdam modum suum*, St. Augustine, *Ep.* 166.2.3). If we ask, *Quomodo?*, seeing that the soul is in time, the answer must be, "in one way only, viz., by continuing to become; since thus it can always leave behind it a new and other nature to take the place of the old" (Plato, *Symposium*, 207 D). It is only God, who is the Soul of the soul, that we can speak of as immortal absolutely (I Tim. 6:16). It is incorrect to call the soul "immortal" indiscriminately, just as it is incorrect to call any man a Genius; man has an immortal Soul, as he has a Genius, but the soul can only be immortalized by returning to its source, that it to say, by dying to

Islam. This soul is the self to be "denied" (the Greek original meaning "utterly reject," with ontological rather than a merely ethical application), the soul that must be "lost" if "it" is to be saved; and which, as Meister Eckhart and the Ṣūfīs so often say, must "put itself to death," or, as the Hindus and Buddhists say, must be "conquered" or "tamed," for "that is not my Self." This soul, subject to persuasion, and distracted by its likes and dislikes, this "mind" that we mean when we speak of having been "minded to do this or that," is "that which thou callest 'I' or 'myself,' " and which Jacob Boehme thus distinguishes from the I that *is,* when he says, with reference to his own illuminations, that "not I, the I that I am, knows these things, but God in me." We cannot treat the doctrine of the Ego at length, but will only say that, as for Meister Eckhart and the Ṣūfīs, "Ego, the word I, is proper to none but God in his sameness," and that "I" can only rightly be attributed to Him and to the one who, being "joined unto the Lord, is one spirit."

That the soul herself, our "I" or "self" itself, should be the Devil—whom we call the "enemy," "adversary," "tempter," "dragon,"—never by a personal name[12]—may seem startling, but it is very far from being a novel proposition. As we go on, it will be found that an equation of the soul with Satan has often been enunciated, and that it provides us with an almost perfect solution of all the problems that the latter's "personality" poses. Both are "real" enough for all pragmatic purposes here, in the active life where "evil" must be contended with, and the dualism of the contraries cannot be evaded; but they are no more "principles," no more really real, than the darkness that is nothing but the privation of light.

No one will deny that the battleground on which the psychomachy must be fought out to a finish is within you, or that, where Christ fights, there also must his enemy, the Antichrist be found. Neither will anyone, "superstition" apart, be likely to pretend that the Temptations of St. Anthony, as depicted in art, can be regarded otherwise than as "projections" of interior tensions. In the same way that Picasso's "Guernica" is the mirror of Europe's disintegrated soul, "the hell of modern existence," the Devil's horns and sting are an image

itself and living to its Self; just as a man becomes a Genius only when he is no longer "himself."

12. Even the Hebrew Sāṭān, "opponent," is not a personal name.

of the most evil beast in man himself. Often enough it has been said by the "Never-enough honoured Auncients," as well as by modern authors, that "man is his own worst enemy." On the other hand, the best gift for which a man might pray is to be "at peace with himself";[13] and, indeed, for so long as he is not at peace with Himself,[14] he can hardly be at peace with anybody else, but will "project" his own disorders, making of "the enemy"—for example, Germany, or Russia, or the Jews—his "devil." "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even from your lusts (pleasure, or desires, Skr. *kāmāḥ*) that contend in your members?" (James 4:1).

As Jung so penetratingly observes: "When the fate of Europe carried it into a four years war of stupendous horror—a war that no one wanted—hardly anyone asked who had caused the war and its continuation."[15] The answer would have been unwelcome: it was "I"—your "I" and mine. For, in the words of another modern psychologist, E. E. Hadley, "the tragedy of this delusion of individuality is that it leads to isolation, fear, paranoid suspicion, and wholly unnecessary hatreds."[16]

All this has always been familiar to the theologians, in whose writings Satan is so often referred to simply as "the enemy." For example, William Law: "You are under the power of no other enemy, are held in no other captivity, and want no other deliverance but from the power of your own earthly self. This is the one murderer of the divine life within you. It is your own Cain that murders your own Abel,"[17] and "self is the root, the tree, and the branches of all the evils of our fallen state . . . Satan, or which is the same thing, self-exaltation. . . . This is that full-born natural self that must be pulled out of

13. *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, 320 where the expression εὖνουν εἶναι σεαυτῷ = μετανοεῖν ("repentance," i.e., "coming to be in one's right mind"), the opposite of παρανοεῖν.

14. The Self we mean when we tell a man who is misbehaving to "Be yourself" (ἐν σαυτῷ γενοῦ, Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 950),—for "all is intolerable when any man forsakes his proper Self, to do what fits him not" (*Ibid.* 902, 903).

15. C. G. Jung, *The Integration of Personality*, p. 274.

16. E. E. Hadley, in *Psychiatry*, 5 (1942) 133; citing also H. S. Sullivan, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-34: "emphasized individuality of each of us, 'myself.' Here we have the very mother of illusions, the ever pregnant source of preconceptions that invalidate almost all our efforts to understand other people."

17. William Law, *The Spirit of Love*, and *An Address to the Clergy*, cited in Stephen Hobhouse, *William Law*, pp. 156, 219, 220.

the heart and *totally denied,* or there can be no disciple of Christ." If, indeed, "the kingdom of heaven is within you," then also the "war in heaven" will be there, until Satan has been overcome, that is, until the Man in this man is "master of himself," *selbes gewaltic,* ἐγκρατὴς ἑαυτοῦ.

For the *Theologia Germanica* (chs. 3, 22, 49), it was the Devil's "I, Me, and Mine" that were the cause of his fall. . . . For the self, the I, the me and the like, all belong to the Evil Spirit, and therefore it is that he is an Evil Spirit. Behold one or two words can utter all that has been said by these many words: "Be simply and wholly bereft of self." For "there is nothing else in hell, but self-will; and if there were no self-will, there would be no devil and no hell". So, too, Jacob Boehme: "this vile self-hood possesses the world and worldly things; and dwells also in itself, which is dwelling in hell"; and Angelus Silesius:

> Nichts anders stürzet dich in Höllenschlund hinein·
> Als dass verhasste Wort (merk's wohl!): das Mein und Dein.[18]

Hence the resolve, expressed in a Shaker hymn:

> But now from my forehead I'll quickly erase
> The stamp of the Devil's great "I."[19]

Citations of this kind could be indefinitely multiplied, all to the effect that of all evil beasts, "the most evil beast we carry in our bosom,"[20] "our most godless and despicable part" and "multifarious beast," which our "Inner Man," like a lion-tamer, must keep under his control or else will have to follow where it leads.[21]

Even more explicit sayings can be cited from Ṣūfī sources, where the soul *(nafs)* is distinguished from the intellect or spirit *('aql, rūḥ)* as the Psyche is distinguished from the Pneuma by Philo and in the New Testament, and as *anima* from *animus* by William of Thierry.[22]

18. Angelus Silesius, *Der Cherubinische Wandersmann,* 5.238.

19. E. D. Andrews, *The Gift to be Simple,* p. 18; cf. p. 79, "That great big I, I'll mortify."

20. Boehme, *De inc. Verbi,* 1.12.20.

21. Plato, *Republic,* 588 C ff. where the whole soul is compared to such a composite animal as the Chimaera, Scylla, or Cerberus. In some respects the Sphinx might have been an even better comparison. In any case, the human, leonine, and ophidian parts of these creatures correspond to the three parts of the soul, in which "the human in us, or rather our divine part" should prevail: of which Hercules leading Cerberus would be a good illustration.

22. William of Thierry, *Epistle to the Brethren of Mont Dieu,* §§ 50, 51.

For the encyclopaedic *Kashfu'l Mahjūb,* the soul is the "tempter," and the type of hell in this world.[23] Al-Ghazālī, perhaps the greatest of the Muslim theologians, calls the soul "the greatest of your enemies"; and more than that could hardly be said of Satan himself. Abū Sā'īd asks: "What is evil, and what is the worst evil?" and answers, "Evil is 'thou,' and the worst evil 'thou' if thou knowest it not"; he, therefore, called himself a "Nobody," refusing, like the Buddha, to identify himself with any nameable "personality."[24] Jalālu'd Dīn Rūmī, in his *Mathnawī,* repeats that man's greatest enemy is himself: "This soul," he says, "is hell," and he bids us "slay the soul." "The soul and Shaitān are both one being, but take two forms; essentially one from the first, he became the enemy and envier of Adam"; and, in the same way, "the Angel (Spirit) and the Intellect, Adam's helpers, are of one origin but assume two forms." The quarrel of the sensitive soul with the Intellect is like that of a woman with the master of the house. The Ego holds its head high: "decapitation means, to slay the soul and quench its fire in the Holy War" *(jihād);* and well for him who wins this battle, for "whoever is at war with himself for God's sake, . . . his light opposing his darkness, the sun of his spirit shall never set."[25]

> 'Tis the fight which Christ,
> With his internal Love and Light,
> Maintains within man's nature, to dispel
> God's Anger, Satan, Sin, and Death, and Hell;
> The human Self, or Serpent, to devour,
> And raise an Angel from it by His Pow'r.
> (John Byrom)

"Spark of the soul . . . image of God, that there is ever in all wise at war with all that is not godly . . . and is called the Synderesis"[26]

23. *Kashf al-Mahjūb,* tr. R. A. Nicholson (Gibb Memorial Series XVII), p. 199; cf. p. 9 "the greatest of all veils between God and man."

24. For Abū Sā'īd see R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism,* p. 53.

25. R. A. Nicholson, *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'd Dīn Rūmī* (Gibb Memorial Series) 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, and *do.,* Text, 4.1, 4.3, 4.5. Citations are from Rūmī 1.2617, 2.2525, 3.374, 2738, 3193, 4053 *(nafs va shaitān har dū ek īn būd'and);* cf. 2.2272 f., 5.2919, 2939. The fundamental kinship of Satan and the Ego is apparent in their common claim to independent being: and "association" (of others with the God who only *is*) amounts, from the Islamic point of view, to polytheism *(ibid,* 4.2675-7).

26. On the meaning of the "Synteresis," etymologically an equivalent of Skr. *saṁ-tāraka,* "one who helps to cross over," see O. Renz, *Die Synteresis nach dem Hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Münster i.W., 1911).

(Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 113). "We know that the Law is of the Spirit . . . but I see another law in my members, warring against the Law of the Intellect, and bringing me into captivity. . . . With the Intellect I myself serve the Law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin. . . . Submit yourselves therefore to God: resist the Devil."[27] And similarly in other Scriptures, notably the *Bhagavad Gītā* (6.5, 6): "Lift up the self by the Self, let not self sit back. For, verily, the Self is both the friend and the foe of the self; the friend of one whose self has been conquered by the Self, but to one whose self hath not (been overcome), the Self at war, forsooth, acts as an enemy"; and the Buddhist *Dhammapada* (103, 160, 380), where "the Self is the Lord of the self" and one should "by the Self incite the self, and by the Self gentle self" (as a horse is "broken in" by a skilled trainer), and "one who has conquered self is the best of all champions." (Cf. Philostratus, *Vit. Ap.*, 1-13: "Just as we break in skittish and unruly horses by stroking and patting them.")

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the Psychomachy is also a "battle of love," and that Christ—to whom "ye should be married . . . that we should bring fruit unto God" (Rom. 7:3)—already loved the unregenerate soul "in all her baseness and foulness,"[28] or that it is of her that Donne says: "Nor ever chaste, except *Thou* ravish me." It was for nothing but "to go and fetch his Lady, whom his Father had eternally given him to wife, and to restore her to her former high estate that the Son proceeded out of the Most High" (Meister Eckhart).[29] The Deity's lance or thunderbolt is, at the same time, his yard, with which he pierces his mortal Bride. The story of the thunder-smitten Semele reminds us that the Theotokos, in the last analysis Psyche, has ever been of Lunar, never herself of Solar stock; and all this is the sum and substance of every "solar myth," the theme of the *Liebesgeschichte Himmels* and of the *Drachenkämpfe*.

"Heaven and earth: let them be wed again."[30] Their marriage, consummated in the heart, is the *Hieros Gamos, Daivam Mithunam*;[31] and those in whom it has been perfected are no longer anyone, but as

27. *Romans* 7:14-23; James 4:7.

28. St. Bonaventura, *Dominica prima post octavum epiphaniae*, 2.2. For the whole theme see, also, my "On the Loathly Bride," *Speculum*, 20 (1945), pp. 391-404.

29. Pfeiffer p. 288.

30. *Ṛgveda* 10.24.5.

31. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 10.5.2.12.

He is "who never became anyone."[32] Plotinus' words: "Love is of the very nature of the Psyche, and hence the constant yoking of Eros with the Psyches in the pictures and the myths"[33] might as well have been said of half the world's fairy-tales, and especially of the Indian "pictures and myths" of Śrī Krishna and the Milkmaids, of which the Indian commentators rightly deny the historicity, asserting that all these are things that come to pass in all men's experience. Such, indeed, are "the *erōtika* (Skr. *śṛṅgāra*) into which, it seems that you, O Socrates, should be initiated," as Diotima says, and which in fact he so deeply respected.[34]

But, this is not only a matter of Grace; the soul's salvation depends also on her submission, her willing surrender; it is prevented for so long as she resists. It is her pride (*māna, abhimāna;* οἴημα, οἴησις; self-opinion, overweening), the Satanic conviction of her own independence (*asmi-māna, ahaṁkāra,* cogito ergo sum), her evil rather than herself, that must be killed; this pride she calls her "self-respect," and would "rather die" than be divested of it. But the death that she at last, despite herself, desires, is no destruction but a transformation. Marriage is an initiatory death and integration (*nirvāṇa, saṁskāra,* τέλος).[35] "Der Drache und die Jungfrau sind natürlich identisch;"[36] the "Fier Baiser" transforms the dragon; the mermaid loses her ophidian tail; the girl is no more when the woman has been "made"; from the nymph the winged soul emerges.[37] And so "through Thee an Iblis may become again one of the Cherubim."[38]

And what follows when the lower and the higher forms of the soul have been united? This has nowhere been better described than in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (2.2.7): "This Self gives itself to that self, and that self to this Self; they become one another; with the one form he (in whom this marriage has been consummated) is unified with yonder world, and with the other united to this world;" the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*

32. *Kaṭha Up.* 2.18.
33. Plotinus, *Enneads* 6.9.9.
34. Plato, *Symposium* 210A.
35. *Nirvāna, Jātaka* 1.60; *saṁskāra,* Manu 2.67; τέλος, Lidell and Scott, *s.v.,* VI. 2.
36. E. Siecke, *Drachenkämpfe,* p. 14.
37. For the Fier Baiser see the references in my "On the Loathly Bride," *(Loc. cit.).* For the marriage, Meister Eckhart (Pfeiffer, p. 407) and Omikron, *Letters from Paulos* (New York, 1920), *passim.*
38. Rūmī, *op. cit.,* 4.3496.

Upanishad (4.3.23): "Embraced by the Prescient-Self, he knows neither a within nor a without. Verily, that is his form in which his desire is obtained, in which the Self is his desire, and in which no more desires or grieves." "Amor ipse non quiescit, nisi in amato, quod fit, cum obtinet ipsum possessione plenaria";[39] "Jam perfectam animam . . . gloriosam sibi sponsam Pater conglutinat."[40] Indeed:

> Dafern der Teufel könnt aus seiner Seinheit gehn,
> So sähest du ihn stracks in Gottes Throne stehn.[41]

So, then, the Agathos and Kakos Daimons, Fair and Foul selves, Christ and Antichrist, both inhabit us, and their opposition is within us. Heaven and Hell are the divided images of Love and Wrath *in divinis,* where the Light and the Darkness are undivided, and the Lamb and the Lion lie down together. In the beginning, as all traditions testify, heaven and earth were one and together; essence and nature are one in God, and it remains for every man to put them together again within himself.

All these are our answers. Satan is not a real and single Person, but a severally postulated personality, a "Legion." Each of these personalities is capable of redemption (apokatastasis), and can, if it will, become again what it was before it "fell"—Lucifer, Phosphorus, Hēlēl, Scintilla, the Morning Star, a Ray of the Supernal Sun; because the Spark, however it may seem to be smothered, is an Asbestos that cannot be extinguished, even in hell. But, in the sense that a redemption of all beings cannot be thought of as taking place at any one time, and inasmuch as there will be devilish souls in need of redemption throughout all time, Satan must be thought of as being damned for ever, meaning by "damned," self-excluded from the vision of God and the knowledge of Truth.

The problem with which we started has been largely solved, but it still remains to accomplish the harder tasks of an actual "self-naughting" and consequent "Self-realization" to which the answers point, and for which theology is only a partial preparation. Satan and the

39. Jean de Castel, *De adhaerendo Deo,* c. 12.

40. St. Bernard, *De grad. humilitatis,* 7.21.

41. Angelus Silesius, *op. cit.,* 1.143. Cf. *Theologia Germanica,* ch. xvi: "If the evil Spirit himself could come into true obedience, he would become an angel [of light] again, and all his sin and wickedness would be blotted out."

Ego are not really entities, but concepts postulated and valid only for present, provisional, and practical purposes; both are composite photographs, as it were of X_1, X_2, X_3. It has often been said that the Devil's most ingenious device is to persuade us that his existence is a mere "superstition." In fact, however, nothing can be more dangerous than to deny his existence, which is as real, although no more so than our own; we dare not deny Satan until we have denied ourselves, as everyone must who would follow Him who said and did nothing "of himself." "What is Love? the sea of non-existence";[42] and "whoever enters there, saying 'It is I,' I (God), smite him in the face";[43] "What is Love? thou shalt know when *thou* becomest *Me*."[44]

42. Rūmī, *op. cit.*, 3.4723.

43. Shams-i-Tabrīz, Ode 28 in R. A. Nicholson, *Dīwāni Shamsi Tabrīz*, p. 115. "None has knowledge of each who enters that he is So-and-so or So-and-so," *Ibid.* p. 61.

44. Rūmī, *op. cit.*, 2, Introduction.

COMMUNICATIONS

PETER MOHYLA

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Assistant Professor of East European Languages, Columbia University

THE THREE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY of the death of Peter Mohyla, Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, deserves more than a passing notice, for he was one of the great figures of the seventeenth century in Eastern Europe. Scholars and critics may evaluate his work in theology, ecclesiastical organization, and politics differently, but even those who judge him most harshly are forced to admit his ability and sincerity and to recognize the great impact which he had upon the life and thought of his times.

His life was a good example of the days when religious affiliation meant more than membership in any political state. He was born in 1596, and was the son of a hospodar of Wallachia and Moldavia at a time when Church Slavonic influence was very strong in those lands. He was educated at Lviv in the Orthodox schools of Poland and then studied abroad, probably at the University of Paris. For a while he served in the Polish army and then, in 1627, he was appointed Abbot of the Monastery of the Caves in Kiev and took orders. Here he showed such zeal in promoting education and was so successful in maintaining good relations with the Polish government that, when it was determined to restore the Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine, he was elected bishop and Metropolitan of Kiev, which was under Polish rule, a post he held to the end of his life. His ecclesiastical superior was the Patriarch of Constantinople, for at this time Kiev was entirely separated from all connection with the Patriarch of Moscow.

Mohyla's whole life was spent in the period before Eastern Europe assumed that form which it held through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He died two years before the revolt of the Zaporozhians under Khmelnitsky against Poland, which was to lead to the extension of Russian Muscovite influence, and also two years before Tsar Alexis, under the inspiration of Nikon, invited Kievan scholars to come to Moscow to commence the work of knitting together the relations between Moscow and the rest of the Orthodox East.

His great achievement was the establishment of the Academy in

Kiev, which was destined to become one of the great schools of the Orthodox world and was in future to furnish the first generation of educated Russian clergy. Yet from the very nature of the situation in Poland, it was almost inevitable that the models that Mohyla copied were the Jesuit schools of Poland. As a result, the scholars of Kiev were little interested in the accomplishments of Western learning, except as they were filtered through the turgid educational system of Poland, which was not as alert and progressive as it had been a century before. The interests of the Academy were theological in a very narrow sense of the word. The languages used were either an archaic form of Church Slavonic or Latin, and there was little or no attempt to introduce the vernacular Ukrainian language into the courses. It might well be said that the Academy of Kiev, great as were its accomplishments and its pupils, was really an archaistic institution in every sense of the word. Its frank object was the adaptation of Scholasticism, as it was then understood in Poland, to the purposes of Orthodox polemics against Roman Catholicism. In a way it was the culmination of that tendency which had begun centuries earlier, when the pressing need of the Greek Emperors for help from the West led them to toy with the idea of acknowledging the Papacy, a policy which delayed by only a few years the fall of Constantinople to the Turks. The natural result was the grafting upon Orthodoxy of the Latin desire for accurate definition of all terms and the use of many theological expressions that fitted in better with the Latin than with the Greek tradition.

Mohyla expounded his views in his Catechism, which was not published in its entirety during his lifetime, but which was formally approved by the Four Eastern Patriarchs in 1643 for translation into Greek and other Orthodox languages and was again accepted by the Council of Jerusalem in 1672. The Catechism of Mohyla represents almost the high-water mark of Roman Catholic influence upon the thinking of the Orthodox Church. From 1672 on the tide turned and step by step many of these innovations were removed from the Catechism and the Church services.

In all this Mohyla represented a stream of Western influence very different from that of the great Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was put to death by the Turks only a few years before Mohyla began his work. Cyril was closely aided by the Protestant embassies in Constantinople,

and was often accused by his enemies of Calvinism. At all events, he was fully aware of the religious developments of England and Holland and had a certain tendency to swing Orthodox thought in that direction. Mohyla, coming from a landlocked area, accepted those influences which were travelling east across the continent, and was more disposed to look with favor upon these Catholic ideas than upon those of the countries still further to the West.

The existence of these two conflicting trends even in Constantinople itself points up the difficult position in which the Patriarch himself had been placed by the fall of the Byzantine Empire and the establishment of Mohammedan rule in the imperial city. Where once the Patriarch had been surrounded by outstanding scholars and enjoyed almost limitless wealth and culture, he was now forced to secure foreign and non-Orthodox aid to maintain himself against the intrigues of the Sultan and his viziers. Education sank rapidly, and fanaticism often replaced sound learning, as the zealous supporters of Orthodoxy, whether in Constantinople or among the Zaporozhian Kozaks, sought to maintain their faith and their hierarchy.

Mohyla did not waver in his Orthodoxy. He did not join the Uniat Church which had been established at Brest Litovsk at the end of the sixteenth century, but he had much to do with the opening of the mind of Kiev to the ideas and methods employed by the Roman Catholic clergy in Poland and of the entire West. A distinguished and respected figure, he stands out among the lesser men of the period and, whether treating with the Kings of Poland or the Patriarchs of the East, he developed his Orthodox Scholasticism to a point where it imposed itself upon Orthodox thought for a couple of centuries. It was no mean achievement, and, even though it has been to some extent outgrown, Mohyla deserves to be commemorated for the zeal with which he advanced his opinions and the skill and energy which he showed in disseminating them and securing their acceptance.

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY

MARGUERITE BECK BLOCK
Associate in Religion, Columbia University

AS THIS ISSUE OF THE REVIEW GOES TO PRESS, we are saddened by news of the passing of one of its valued contributors, Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. In the four articles and many book reviews of his which we have been privileged to publish, he has given us generously of his vast erudition and his stimulating originality of thought. We shall in future feel the lack of his personal interest, expressed in many helpful suggestions and criticisms. We shall also miss his salty (sometimes peppery!) comments on our editorial emendations of his texts.

Besides his friendly co-operation with the *Review of Religion* since its modest beginnings, we have still other causes for gratitude to him. Our splendid selection of slides of Indian images and temples, in the Bush Collection of Religion and Culture, was made with his advice, and very largely from his own photographs. And his works, the *History of Indian and Indonesian Art, Rajput Painting, The Origin of the Buddha Image, Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* and *Yakshas,* to name but a few, have been the foundation stones on which our card index is built.

There are others far better qualified to praise Dr. Coomaraswamy's life work in the field of Oriental art—the great collections assembled in Boston under his direction, the depth and breadth of his research, and the richness of his literary output, but the present writer wishes here to pay tribute to him as a teacher. Some of us who were fortunate enough to attend his course in Indian art at the Metropolitan Museum, in 1933 I think it was, will never forget the unique quality of the experience. We were not permitted to take notes (they were furnished us on mimeographed sheets) but sat in the Stygian darkness and stifling jungle heat of the unventilated classroom, our attention concentrated on the brilliant images on the screen—strange, fascinating, repellent, beautiful! And the quiet, even tones of the lecturer's voice flowed on, carrying us with him into an unknown, exotic world—evoking rather than expounding, revealing esoteric meanings, arousing in us feelings and dim racial memories we had never known we possessed. It was

more like an initiation into ancient mysteries than a course in "art appreciation"! We emerged a trifle shaken into the spring brightness of Fifth Avenue, with the dazed eyes of one who truly "on honey-dew hath fed, and drunk the milk of Paradise."

Besides this peculiar glamor with which he invested his subject, one remembers also the sharp, pungent remarks with which he expressed his scorn of all poor craftsmanship: "After the curtain has gone up, it is too late to produce a masterpiece," a maxim to which he lived up with meticulous care, each lecture of his being as precisely constructed as a ship model. We learned from him that art is of the very stuff of life, to be *used,* not stared at in a museum, that it has a normal function in human life, and is not (or should not be) "the pearl in a sick oyster": "Art is simply man's handiwork done finely." His contempt for the pathological exhibitionism of so much of contemporary art was distinctly refreshing.

One of Dr. Coomaraswamy's most endearing traits was his generosity toward many other workers in his field, and his liberal appreciation of their contributions. When the dancer, La Meri, was seeking a publisher for her magnificent book on *The Gesture Language of the Hindu Dance,* it was his gracious offer to write a Foreword, thus lending his own great prestige to the work of an unknown author, which won for it acceptance by a distinguished university press. Another example of this fine spirit was his warm friendship for the late Heinrich Zimmer, who came to our shores a refugee from Hitler's Germany, and since Zimmer's untimely death, Dr. Coomaraswamy has rendered generous assistance to Mr. Joseph Campbell in his difficult task of editing the Zimmer manuscripts for publication.

In his own philosophy, Coomaraswamy belonged actually to neither East nor West, but to that transcendental realm which includes the highest speculations of both—the metaphysical "one world" of the *Philosophia Perennis.* There he walked, detached and aloof, with his chosen companions—Gautama Buddha, Śankara, Plato, Plotinus, Boehme, and Meister Eckhart. And it was in the terms of this philosophy that he confessed his own faith in

the impassible "immortal, incorporeal Self of *Chāndogya Up.* VIII. 12.1, the "That" of the famous dictum, "That art thou." And, just as for Plato, so in

the Vedic books, this deathless, impassible Inner Man and very Self "dwells together with" the human, mortal, passible self in the "house" or "city" of the body for so long as "we" are alive. It is this (Holy) "Ghost" that we "give up" when we die: and the poignant question arises, "In whom, when I go forth, shall I be going forth?" (*Praśna Up.* VI.3), the answer, according to which we shall be "saved" or "lost" depending upon whether before the end we have known "Who we are" . . . .*

* *Review of Religion,* VII (1942), 35 f.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Crest-Jewel of Wisdom and Other Writings of Śankarāchārya. Translations and Commentaries by Charles Johnston. Covina, California: Theosophical University Press, 1946. viii, 163 pp. $2.00.

The main section of the book under review is *The Crest-Jewel of Wisdom (Vivekachudāmani)*, covering seventy-six pages. The rest contains three minor works and the *Song of the Self*, all by Śankarāchārya, and a few short essays by the translator. The translations were originally published in the last decade of the nineteenth century by William Quan Judge, a prominent member of the Theosophical Society. The purpose was to "vindicate the importance of old Asiatic literature, namely, of the Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Zoroastrian philosophies." The translator, Charles Johnston, was, we are told, a teacher of Sanskrit.

The Crest-Jewel of Wisdom is a vade mecum of Vedānta philosophy. It is a remarkable instance of an abstruse philosophy written in melodious poetry, a feat achieved only, perhaps, in the Sanskrit language. The aim of the book, like that of other treatises on the Non-dualistic Vedānta, is the establishment of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, called Brahman, by means of which a seeker rids himself of the misery and bondage of the relative existence and experiences the highest felicity and freedom.

The present translation has been rendered in beautiful English and gives the reader a glimpse of the poetry of the original. Further, it indicates the warmth of feeling the translator cherished for the subject-matter. This friendly spirit is certainly in contrast with the cold and critical treatment of Hindu philosophy shown by the erudite Indologists of the nineteenth century, not excepting even the great Max Müller.

The translation is too free and abounds in unfamiliar words and phrases whose import will hardly be understood by the general reader. The book, as has been noted above, contains many abstruse philosophical ideas and technical words. The translator has not given any explanatory notes. He has, in addition, introduced Theosophical terms to translate Sanskrit words, and this creates great confusion. The free translation in many instances distorts the meaning of the original. A few examples are given below:

Page 9. "For beings a human birth is hard to win, then manhood and holiness, then excellence in the path of wise law; hardest of all to win is wisdom." The literal translation of the Sanskrit is: "For all beings a human birth is difficult to obtain, more so is a male body, rarer than that is brāhminhood, rarer still is attachment to the path of Vedic religion; higher than this is erudition in the scriptures."

Page 9. "Freedom is not won even in a hundred years of the Evolver." The literal translation is: "Freedom is not won in the lifetime of a hundred Brahmās put together." Brahmā is the highest manifestation of the Absolute in time and space.

Page 11. "Then the six graces, beginning with restfulness." The Sanskrit word *sampatti* means treasures or attributes. Likewise, the word *sama* denotes calmness of mind.

Page 12. The wise teacher *(guru),* according to the translator, refers to the "Higher Self." But it seems to us that Śankarāchārya means another human being endowed with certain spiritual qualities.

Page 13. "Good souls" has nothing to do with "Mahātmās." The Theosophical writers should not use their peculiar concepts and terms when dealing with other systems of thought.

Page 14. The translator uses the English word "Eternal" to translate "Brahman" or the Absolute of Vedānta. This word is really untranslatable. Eternity is one of Brahman's attributes.

Page 15. The subtle elements are described as "the ethereal, the upper air, the flaming, water, and earth." The first three words, meaning *ākāśa,* air, and fire, are certainly confusing.

Page 20. The *prānas* are enumerated as "the forward-life, the downward-life, the distributing-life, and the uniting-life; their activities and forms are different, as gold and water are different." These English equivalents of the *prānas* are meaningless jargon. The last part of the sentence is altogether wrong. The true meaning is that the *prāna* or life-force in the body appears in five different forms, as gold is fashioned into various ornaments, and as water takes the form of waves, foam, etc.

Page 21. Ahamkāra is not "self-assertion" but "I-consciousness."

Page 22. "The power of the supreme Master," "three potencies," and "glamor" are confusing and misleading translations of "the power of the supreme Godhead," "three *gunas,*" and *"māyā."* The three *gunas*

are enumerated as "substance," "force," and "darkness." This also is misleading.

Page 24. Indriya does not mean "power"; it means "sense-organ."

Such instances may be multiplied ad infinitum. To be sure, the book reads well and the language is rhythmic, but how much of the real meaning of the text the reader gets is an altogether different matter.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century the Theosophists undoubtedly played an important part in the regeneration of Hinduism in India. They also helped in introducing certain Hindu spiritual ideas in the Western world. Theosophical scholars translated into English with real enthusiasm some of the Hindu scriptures. At that time the loose use of words and careless expressions was overlooked, but today the people of the West want exact translations and correct interpretations.

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center
New York City

The Rise of the Jewish Community of New York, 1654-1860. By HYMAN B. GRINSTEIN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1945. xiv, 645 pp. $3.00.

The Jewish community of New York City numbers over 2,000,000 persons, and is the greatest single aggregation of the sons and daughters of Israel in history. It did not leap full-grown into this numerical strength, but reached its present status by a process of steady and, at times, rapid evolution. In this massive and detailed volume, Hyman B. Grinstein has traced the rise of the New York Community in a period of over two hundred years, commencing with 1654, when the first Jewish settlers came to New Amsterdam, and ending with the year 1860, a few years after a substantial German-Jewish immigration to the United States, and a few decades before the advent of the extensive East-European Jewish influx. There have been many studies of European Jewries, nearly all of which have been extirpated by the Nazis, and these include information, now all the more valuable because so many source-documents have been destroyed with their custodians. The story of New York Jewry, as recounted by Dr. Grinstein, takes its place by

the side of the fascinating chronicles of a "world-passed-by," to use the title of Marvin Lowenthal's well-known book.

Anyone who desires to understand aright the institutions and activities of present-day New York Jewry will do well to peruse with close attention Dr. Grinstein's carefully annotated pages. We take too much for granted the eminence of the philanthropic, religious, cultural, and social organizations of the local Jewish community, forgetting that they are the consequence of endeavor and sacrifice on the part of those who have preceded us. Moreover, neither Jews nor non-Jews are sufficiently mindful of the fact that the roots of American Jewry reach into the beginnings of our country itself, and that Jews were in the Dutch settlements as soon as they were formed. We know not only that Columbus may have been a Marrano Jew, but, as established facts, we have learned that members of his crew were Jews, and that not Isabella's jewels, but her Jews financed the initial voyages of discovery. We have been told that the pedigree of New York Jewry is ancient and estimable, and that its present-day inhabitants may pride themselves on their aristocratic lineage. But it is heartening to discover the documentary evidence clearly and irrefutably presented by the research and literary skill of Dr. Grinstein.

The author declares in his preface that he has given little information concerning the social, cultural, economic, and political activities which the Jews shared with their Christian neighbors, leaving this to a later volume. He has, however, devoted himself to the inner life of the Jews of New York City, "their institutions, their religion and their culture—and with the social, philanthropic and other activities which grew out of their living together in a Jewish community." At the same time, it was inevitable that he should present considerable material concerning the relationships of Jews and Christians, especially in his chapter dealing with intermarriage and conversion. He says at one point:

> The causes of intermarriage in the eighteenth century seem to have included not only the close social relations between Jews and Christians in New York City, but also the limited choice available for those Jewish men and women who sought marriage within the Jewish community. The native Jewish men seem, on the whole, to have intermarried out of preference more than from necessity, for there were many unmarried women at Shearith Israel (the Spanish synagogue) whom they might have married. Jewish women, on the other hand, seem for the most part to have preferred spinsterhood to inter-

marriage. The early nineteenth century, however, tells a different story (p. 373).

Dr. Grinstein has occupied himself primarily with the forces molding the community, with synagogue organization, social welfare, society and culture, religious practice, religious dissent and "wider horizons." He has drawn upon relevant material, not only in the publications of the period covered in the volume, but also upon documents in the archives of synagogues and other institutions, and upon important manuscript material not yet generally utilized or known. It must be said, however, that there is considerable additional manuscript material of a similar content and character which Dr. Grinstein has not perused, perhaps because it has proved difficult for some institutions with records to make them accessible. There are numerous excellent illustrations in the book which contribute greatly to its appeal.

There are many delightful items in the volume which readers are sure to find amusing and edifying. We read that, in 1834, the "Hazzan," or precentor, was asked by the Shearith Israel congregation not to pitch the tone too high, for this tended to cause "disorder and confusion" in the singing of the psalms. In 1830, a certain M.S., without an officiating clergyman, performed a marriage between himself and a certain Miss M.I., in order, as he said, that "no one else could marry her" while he was away. After considerable discussion, the Rabbinical authorities pronounced the couple legally married. (The regulations governing marriage today are, of course, far more specific.) The great Max Lilienthal, in seeking to improve the *Shehita* system governing the slaughter of animals in accordance with the Jewish ritual, was told by the butchers: "We are in a free land. No one can interfere in our business. If anyone should do so, we will sue him for libel." Fortunately state laws have been passed to meet such situations today. In 1859, it was reported that a Jewish child given to a nurse was said to have been baptized. The Congregation Anshei Hesed, together with three other congregations, brought suit for the return of the child. The case was tried before Judge Russel, who ordered the child returned to its parents. New York was not Rome, where the famous "Mortara Affair" had resulted in an opposite outcome. When Reform Judaism began to make headway, a contemporaneous observer termed the worshipers "dummies" who sat back and listened but did not take part in the service. As a result of the de-

mand for English preaching, Raphael De Cordova, the celebrated humorist, was engaged as a lay preacher to speak every other week after the Service was over.

In 1859 a certain "Pinchas" writing in "The Jewish Messenger" lamented:

> So many commandments are wilfully transgressed, the Holy Law treated as a dead letter, the Sabbath neglected, the dietary provisions seemingly discountenanced. . . . To visit our synagogues on a Sabbath and observe the poor attendance is in itself convincing proof of the melancholy state of things. . . . There was a time when the Synagogues were crowded every Sabbath with devout worshipers, when scarcely standing room could be obtained on the days when an English discourse was delivered. Then there were two Congregations; now there are nearly twenty. Should an increase in numbers cause a diminution in religious feeling?

From this Jeremiad it would seem as if New York Jewry nearly eighty years ago was on the way to religious dissolution. But today there are several hundred synagogues and, while the attendance is not so large as to make standing room scarce, nevertheless the congregations flourish; their Temple House programs are manifold, and the synagogues are veritable community universities, with religious worship as the leitmotif.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Grinstein will write the story of New York Jewry from 1860 to the present time, so that the forces set in motion in the early years may be further understood as they have revealed themselves since the Civil War. The second volume will be sure to display the same power of interpretation, the same care for the minutiae of circumstance and opinion, and the same breadth of scholarship which the present volume evinces. It is most pleasant to come to know, in various aspects of their activities, men like Mordecai Manual Noah, Isaac Leeser, Max Lilienthal, S. M. Isaacs, Jacques Lyons, and the multitude of other personalities in the galaxy of portraits which Dr. Grinstein has drawn. It will be equally pleasant, when the next volume from his pen in the same field appears, to read of Michael Heilprin, Emma Lazarus, Aaron Wise, Gustave Gottheil, and other giants of "only yesterday" in the New York Jewish Community.

Louis I. Newman

New York City

The Body and Eternal Life. By Carl-Martin Edsman. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1946. 72 pp.

This is fascicle II of the volume, *Melanges Johs. Pedersen,* in course of publication by the Nathan Söderblom Society of Uppsala. It is a comparative and exegetical study, and traverses a vast field of philological and exegetical study. Beginning with a statement of the difficulty involved in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body ("which is fundamental to Christianity") for the philosophically minded, the author shows how this problem was dealt with in the age of the apologists and fathers. One method was to appeal to the scriptures, the other to the use of reason—though the latter appeal is involved in the former, since reason has to be used in interpreting and applying the data of scripture (despite Tertullian?). In fact—and here we turn the page, and are confronted with a delightful surprise: a page from the still unpublished treatise *On the Resurrection of the Human Bodies* by John of Dârâ (9th cent.). The passage is from Book I, Chapter 6, and the gist of it is that God can gather together the parts of the human body, though scattered over the earth, with as little effort as a man lays pearls on his fingers and then brings them together in his palm by the simple expedient of closing his hand—a somewhat naïve illustration, but appropriate. One striking feature is the suddenness of the resurrection:

> For the will of the Creator is swifter than the mind,
> and its swiftness cannot be imagined by the intellect;
> There is nothing so sudden as to be comparable to it
> with the only exception of the twinkling of an eye,
> and even that is slow.
> And as regards this wonder Isaiah says:
> Who has heard anything like this, or who has seen
> that in one and the same day and moment the earth travails
> and gives birth to men?

The passage is traced back to Jacob of Serûgh: the idea, and perhaps the illustration, are older still (we might point out that in the Didache a somewhat similar illustration appears, viz., wheat growing on the hills, then "gathered" into the eucharistic loaf). The suddenness of the resurrection is, of course, found in St. Paul; it is also found in Mohammed, who shared it with the popular Syrian mission preaching of

the time (p. 5). In fact, the complex of ideas—restoration, resurrection, as sudden and as inevitable as birth—can be traced back to the Old Testament (esp. Isa. 66:7-8). The different versions of this passage, and even the textual variants, are studied as illustrating the History of Interpretation in Judaism and in the ancient church. This does not sound very promising, but the author is, nevertheless, able to find traces of old paths leading off in several interesting directions. The Greek version, e.g., with its *exephuge,* leads off toward "the Messianic dogmatics of later Judaism" (he means "of *ancient* Judaism"), with its stress on the desert, on the idea of a renewal of the desert wanderings, on the importance of the ethics associated with the desert. For example, "In the prophets and in Jesus the desert perspective breaks through and manifests itself in severe cultural criticism, or in disregard of civilized life as a whole" (p. 32). The author's fascinating detours are always suggestive, even when one has to disagree with him, e.g., (p. 38): "the doctrine of a world-destruction through fire has been a fixed element in Christian eschatology." Yes, more or less—since II Peter, but not always with very much emphasis.

The study even throws light on liturgical history (§ 7), i.e., Edsman finds evidence for a second "Sabbath of the Departed."

> Thus in his mêmrâ on the End, Jacob of Serûgh, likewise a Jacobite, probably applies an interpretation of Isa. 66:8 that was already in practice through the liturgical use of the text. Even though the MS with the note is a century younger than the Syrian father, it may with tolerable certainty be supposed that the liturgical tradition is far older than the MS. How old, cannot be ascertained; it is, however, not impossible that Justin's . . . interpretation is founded upon it (p. 51).

There are also notes on various similes and figures used in Hellenized Judaism and early Eastern Christianity (the potter, the statue, the casket), and on similar images and their ritual background in Indian, Greco-Oriental, and Iranian religions.

It was recognized by the great Origen of Alexandria that to explain these things by simply asserting, "With God all things are possible," was really much too easy, and did not give to the questioner credit for much intelligence. And although the refinements of later scholastic theology are not to be looked for in these old Eastern and Syrian fathers, they do have some brilliant passages in which they argue, quite naturally, by using imagery and illustration—what else can be done?

(see I Cor. 15!) It was the method of the Orient (p. 52): "A peculiar mixture of imagination, poetic power, and shrewdness characterizes this method." Here is a beautiful example with which to close this review:

> If the notion of the Eucharistic elements as *pharmaka athanasias* is combined with the linguistic fact that *margarita* [in Syriac] also means a particle of the Eucharistic bread soaked in the wine, the result is an exquisite though perhaps far-fetched symbolism: the transfigured body, whose power of new life is, among other things, due to the sacramental particle it has received, "the pearl," is made up by its several particles into a whole, just as "the pearls" together constitute the host (p. 55).

This is a valuable little book, opening doors and windows along corridors long unvisited by the majority of scholars. Such *melanges* are most welcome!

FREDERICK C. GRANT.

Union Theological Seminary

The Rebirth of Christianity. By STANLEY COOK. 2nd ed. (Pelican Series A116) Middlesex, England, and New York: Penguin Books, 1946. viii, 218 pp. 25 cents.

An Introduction to the Bible. By STANLEY COOK. 2nd ed. (Pelican Series A144) Middlesex, England, and New York: Penguin Books, 1946. vii, 223 pp. 25 cents.

"Every age has its needs:" writes Professor Cook, "ages can be distinguished by their dominating trend. Characteristic of today is the anticipation of a better order, age or epoch; and, certainly, were there a reformulated and renewed Christianity it would have the widest permanent effects by reason of its legitimate claims to rationality and comprehensiveness" (p. 205). This statement supplies the key to the first of the two small volumes noted above. Professor Cook believes in the fundamental power and adequacy of the Christian ideas and especially in their relevance to our time. Thus he hopes for a "rebirth of Christianity." However, unlike so many at present who hold a similar position, he very wisely sees that much of the task to be done must center about the *reinterpretation* of the Christian world view. Professor Cook makes abundantly plain, in his well stocked pages, his recognition of the cultural matrix of all religion, and hence of the futility of all flatly dogmatic assertions of the validity and relevance of religious ideas concern-

ing man, his natural environment, and God, especially when this involves a complete neglect of prevailing culture and its forms.

Comparing the period of the Birth of Christianity with our own period, which may witness a Rebirth of Christianity, Professor Cook maintains that, just as developing Christianity had to express itself through the available intellectual and cultural forms, and also had to make explicit its relation to contemporary non-religious ideas, any rebirth must involve "a fresh adjustment of 'religious' and 'non-religious' ideas, beliefs and knowledge—the restatement of the old in a new form" (p. 185). The importance of such reinterpretation cannot be overestimated, since it is one of the glaring inconsistencies of an age which values change and novelty above all else that only a very few (and these only very recently) have seen the vital necessity of doing for the Christian religion what every great Christian thinker has done in the past, i.e., reinterpret the "wisdom of God," a "stumbling block" and a "foolishness," making use of the concepts developed in the thought of those whose guide is the "wisdom of this world." It is one of the merits of Professor Cook's volume that it represents an attempt to deal with this problem.

After an introductory section in which the present world situation is subjected to analysis, Professor Cook outlines, in excellent fashion for so short a space, the important beliefs of Christianity, with particular emphasis on the continuity between the experience recorded in both Testaments. This is followed by a section on comparative religion which seeks to lay stress on "fundamental dispositions" which are religious in nature, and which, according to Professor Cook, are not to be completely identified with their particular ritual expressions or other cultural manifestations. "Particular ideas of a heaven, and more especially of a hell," says the author, "may be no longer acceptable, but the basic feelings to which they give expression should not be ignored" (p. 58).

Professor Cook goes on to consider the problem, present in all religious traditions, of the relation between time and eternity, between the actual state of affairs and things "as they should be." In this respect his approach is similar to that of contemporary "realistic" theology, in that he recognizes the fruitful character of tension between these opposites, at the same time criticizing the evils accompanying the extremes of both secularism and other-worldliness. He discusses in an interesting, if

not always completely clear, way the importance of the idea of the universal community informed by the spirit of Christ, and the place this idea and its continual concrete approximation can have in the building of a new world order. The following passage admirably sums up the author's conviction on this head and also indicates what may be done about it:

> . . . the conception of the "Body of Christ" is of far reaching, indeed of ultimate meaning; it embraces our own ideas of rational unity, control and government: the *ideal* relations between man and man, and the *actual* relations between God and the world. Meanwhile the *practical* task of the age will be to restate our ideas of man's treatment of man and God's treatment of his creatures (p. 157).

The number of different questions treated in the book is enormous, and they range through such diverse fields as biblical criticism, anthropology, philosophy, biology, and theology. A thorough treatment is out of the question in a short space, however there are several points which merit further consideration. Professor Cook, greatly influenced by Whitehead, is anxious to maintain continuity between man and nature, hence he rightly rejects traditional supernaturalism. On the basis of this continuity he warns us, however, against omitting from any consideration of the data which comprise the universe the experience of man in his search for completness beyond the actual tragedy of frustration, and for the perfection which comes only from beyond man and his environment although immanent in both. Man is a part of nature and, as such, his experience must not be overlooked in the attempt to understand "nature" and the natural world. This approach, "anthropic," as Professor Cook calls it, reminds us of St. Augustine in the thirteenth book of his *Confessions*, where he discusses man's status as one of the natural creatures, but as one made not to conform to his own kind, but destined to embody the perfection which is of God.

The author rightly emphasizes the importance of putting revelation to the test of reason and experience, since, as the New Testament writer puts it, "many false prophets have gone out into the world" (I John 4:1). Many, however, who are in complete agreement with him on this point will raise questions concerning his repeated critical references to "irrationalism" (pp. 41, 197-98) none of which is specific, and also concerning his denial of an "ultimate irrationality" (p. 197). If the latter denial simply expresses Professor Cook's *faith* in ultimate *ration-*

ality then there is no ground for dispute, however this is not made clear. The author does not sufficiently recognize the contribution made by those whose concern is for the non-formal or "existential" aspects of experience, in opposition to a rationalism which either loses contact with the whole range of immediate experience or attempts to reduce it to "nothing but" its antecedent conditions. The "existentialist" position is admittedly inadequate as a positive solution, however, we must not overlook its value in exposing the pretensions, not so much of reason and science, as of rationalism.

In connection with this point, some further question can be raised concerning Professor Cook's understanding of mysticism. On most occasions he seems to take it as a synonym for irrationalism (pp. 41, 58-59), which it certainly is not. The mystic, in his attempt to pass beyond form to the *prius* of all distinctions of essence, rests in the immediacy of silence (μυεῖν) which, precisely because it is immediate is neither rational or irrational.[1] Suffice it to say that the connection between mysticism and a high regard for reason is overlooked more often than not. This connection can be seen readily by turning to such actual mystics as Plotinus, Nicholas of Cusa, Bonaventura, Spinoza, and Hegel. Francis Bacon would have considered them system builders and rationalists, which indeed they are.

Professor Cook's *Introduction to the Bible,* described in the Preface (p. v) as a companion piece to the book reviewed above, deals more definitely, as its name implies, with the sacred writings of Christianity, and aims at providing the material for an intelligent understanding of the books and their historical settings. A valuable discussion is given of the importance of the English Bible for western culture, together with the relevant data concerning the canon, the authenticity of the text, and the problems connected with its transmission. This material is of the highest importance for any understanding of the biblical writings and is rarely presented in a form intelligible to the layman. Professor Cook's volume is very helpful in this connection.

One section compares the Bible with other sacred writings, and a brief exposition of the contents of these writings accompanies the comparison. Professor Cook is interested in presenting the Bible as a whole, so to speak, and particularly in its impact upon western thought and

1. Irwin Edman in his well known essay, "The Logic of Mysticism in Plotinus," has made this point very well.

culture. It is at this point that the theme of reinterpretation enters again; he says:

> The aim today should be to endeavor to understand the thought of the ancient writers in relation to the times in which they lived. . . . Only in this way can we understand the Bible dynamically, treating it, not as a book on our bookshelves, but as enshrining the profoundest of developments in the past history of our race. So shall we not treat the Bible as an armory of proof-texts. . . . If the Bible has been the book as taught solely by the Church, it is a *reinterpretation* of the Bible that modern conditions of life and thought are demanding (p. 44, italics mine).

Worthy of special mention is the chapter, "Jerusalem and Mount Zion," which is designed to make clear the importance for Israel of Jerusalem and its Temple, and also to show the function of belief in the "holy mountain" in giving unity to the Bible; the belief of the Old Testament in the presence of God in his sanctuary passes over into belief in God's presence in his church, "the Israel of God," through the spirit of Christ. To this end Professor Cook traces briefly the history of Jerusalem, "the sacred city of the three great monotheisms Judaism, Christianity and Islam" (p. 134), from the period prior to the Old Testament to the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70.

One misprint may be noted—"teach" for "teachings" on page 32. Also Professor Cook would have done better to have had Spinoza (1632-1677) "guessing" about Hebrew manuscripts in the seventeenth century rather than the eighteenth.

JOHN E. SMITH

BARNARD COLLEGE

Milton's Paradise Lost: A Commentary on the Argument. By JOHN S. DIEKHOFF. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. 161 pp. $2.00.

Amid the welter of recent and some not so recent articles and books which have delighted in dissecting the body of Milton's work and laying each quivering member open to the gaze of a curious world, it is a great pleasure to come across this book by a non-Satanist whose chief aim is not to analyze but to synthesize, not to make many members of one man but to point out the unity of the person amid the diversity of his thought. For to Mr. Diekhoff, Milton is a rounded, intelligible poet

who, through a lifetime of study and struggle, had arrived at a view of life which was characterized by its temperance, its consistency, and its universal applicability to the problems of human existence. And so, Mr. Diekhoff states it as his main concern "to determine what according to Milton should be the guiding principles of an individual human life."

It is important to emphasize the phrase, "according to Milton," in this statement, for the author always strongly insists on going to the text of Milton for an enunciation of these principles. He does not allow what other critics and scholars have thought Milton said or intended to say to obscure the plain sense of Milton's own words. And therein lies one of the great values of the book. At every point in the development of his argument, the author marshals an imposing array of quotations and, in effect, lets Milton speak for himself. One gets the feeling that this is not the devil quoting scripture, but an honest advocate whose primary interest is in *presenting* all the evidence on any given point and not in *using* that evidence for any personal or professional ends.

Before attempting to set down those principles which, in Milton's view, should control human life, Mr. Diekhoff gives some consideration to the question of what Milton thought the poet's function to be. He finds that Milton was following a long and illustrious line of Renaissance as well as classical critics in holding that the purpose of poetry should be to instruct and to delight. Those who chose to defend poetry against the charges of immorality leveled against it were led to place instruction above mere pleasure, but they insisted, at the same time, on the beauties of poetry as a means of making the instruction in virtue more acceptable to those who could profit by it. But Milton did not stop here. To his practical mind the knowledge and love of virtue were wasted if they did not find expression in action. And so he adds persuasion to the list of duties of the poet. In this, again, he was but following such Renaissance critics as Minturno and Scaliger, who had held the theory that poetry and rhetoric had the common purpose of persuasion. The poet, then, had a three-fold function: to teach, to please, and to move to virtuous action; and all the tools of rhetoric were the legitimate instruments of the poet.

One of the most commonly used devices of the rhetorician was that of the example which presented principles in action, and Mr. Diekhoff

sees *Paradise Lost* as an example used by Milton to persuade his readers to enter into the way of virtue. He is disturbed—and justifiably so—that because of the framework of theology which Milton's example employs, it will lose much of the persuasive power for a twentieth century mind that it had for a seventeenth century audience. The modern student, unfortunately, has all too little knowledge of or sympathy with the great problems of theology and is, therefore, seriously handicapped when he tries to understand Milton's moral principles, which are so firmly based on his conceptions of the nature of God and man and their relationship to each other. One is a bit concerned, then, when Mr. Diekhoff states "his conviction that *Paradise Lost* is a 'feigned example,' a fiction, however historical and however philosophical, and that its meaning may therefore be understood and its bearing on conduct determined without special concern for theological controversies." And, in fact, it is a little difficult to reconcile this conviction with a statement which closely follows: "The moral principles that we can isolate from Milton's theology were not enough for Milton. They had validity for him only within the framework of his theology. To remove Milton's ethical system from that framework is to separate it from the basis of its validity." One can endorse this latter statement wholeheartedly, but there are certain reservations that go with the former. It is obviously a difficult problem that confronts Mr. Diekhoff: to make intelligible and tolerable to the present-day student Milton's ethical principles which have their basis in a theology the modern does not understand. Theologians will not be happy over the way some of the points of doctrine are handled, but Mr. Diekhoff is reaching for a wider audience than that of professional theologians or even professional Miltonists, and one can perhaps overlook certain technical lapses in view of the vibrant and living Milton which his study presents.

Of the rhetorical aids to proof, Mr. Diekhoff points out two especially that were used by Milton. First, there was his effort to establish his personal character with his reader, or, as Mr. Diekhoff puts it, "by his prologues to secure the confidence of his audience." It was good Aristotelian doctrine that the fitness of the speaker to handle his subject had much to do with the willingness of the audience to listen, and perhaps, thereby, be persuaded of the truth of the argument. In his prose, Milton is quite explicit about his reasons for writing apologies for himself; he is attempting to establish his worthiness to fight in the

lists for a high and holy cause. And Mr. Diekhoff maintains that the invocations to Books I, III, VII, and IX of *Paradise Lost* serve, among other ends, the rhetorical function of convincing his audience of his fitness to speak on the dread and solemn subjects treated in the epic. Here we have another instance of Milton's combining the functions of rhetoric with those of poetry.

The second rhetorical aid to proof that Milton uses in the poem is that of inducing in his audience a state of mind sympathetic to his cause. Or he attempts "by his narrative to engage their affections." He wants not only to secure the reader's interest, but also to make the reader feel about the characters and issues involved what the poet wants him to feel about them. In order to accomplish this, Mr. Diekhoff says, Milton must furnish a "demonstration of the evil of Satan, the innocence and subsequent guilt of Adam and Eve, the justice of God, and the compassion of the Son." He then proceeds to the main body of the book, which is devoted to a consideration of Milton's demonstration of these qualities in his chief characters. This may sound like stating what you want to find and then going out and finding it, but Mr. Diekhoff is too sound a critic to do that. He sticks too closely to the text, and at no time does one feel that he is doing violence to Milton's own thought.

In dealing with the problem of the evil of Satan, Mr. Diekhoff is forced to give some attention to the so-called Satanists—those critics and students of *Paradise Lost* who have insisted that Satan is the moral as well as the dramatic hero of the epic, that in him Milton put more of himself than in any of the other characters. Against such critics, Mr. Diekhoff brings an argument heavily weighted with testimony that points quite clearly to the fact that Milton intended, at least, to present in the person of Satan the very embodiment of all that is evil. But that this was Milton's intention is not seriously questioned by many scholars. In view of the imposing mass of texts Mr. Diekhoff has carefully assembled, certainly one could not deny the badness of Satan's character. Why, then, are so many drawn by sympathy to him in his hopeless struggle against the Almighty? Why do we admire his courage more than God's power, his malice more than God's love, his eloquence more than God's goodness? Perhaps an answer to these troublesome questions will come not so much from closer study of Milton's Satan as from a fuller awareness of the limitations of our own dimmed reasons, inherited

from those Primal Parents who themselves fell by confusing the lesser with the greater good, means with ends, and self-will with God's will.

Throughout the other chapters dealing with Milton's basic demonstrations of man's guilt, God's justice, and His providence and mercy, Mr. Diekhoff's insistence is unvarying—for the purposes of the narrative, at least, we must accept Milton's statements of the reality of these states or qualities. If we remain unconvinced by the demonstrations, then, in a sense, Milton has failed; he has fallen short of his full purpose. Mr. Diekhoff is aware of certain faults in Milton's logic, as, for instance, when, in attempting to prove that God rules by merit, he uses the goodness of God as an assumption and also as one of his conclusions. But this merely indicates the difficulties involved in applying formal logic to ultimate truths. Whatever the flaws that seem to reside in the artistic form of expression, however, one should not allow them to obscure the body of truths which Milton meant to set down in a "composition, and patterne of the best and honourablest things."

In attempting to ascertain, therefore, what the Miltonic guiding principles of action were, it is extremely important that we keep in mind that there may be a great difference between the assertion of those principles and the proof of their validity, or the persuasion to act on them. Unless we clearly understand this distinction, we may fall into the error of confusing *what* the poet was trying to do with *how* he did it—or failed to do it. Mr. Diekhoff avoids this confusion simply by giving Milton credit for knowing what he wanted to say and for having said it clearly and explicitly. And, in his presentation of the argument, he makes it appear that Milton spoke effectively and persuasively, too. Mr. Diekhoff also believes that the moral principles enunciated by Milton have just as much validity today as when they were written. Milton was writing, he says, for us, for all mankind fallen, and we, in this deterministic and materialistic age, have much to learn from the Miltonic ethic with its emphasis on "the doctrine of free choice and the correlative doctrine of individual responsibility for individual actions. . . ."

We need also to understand, as Milton understood, that our ethics and our politics are but parts of the same discipline, and that without ethics our political freedoms become meaningless. Mr. Diekhoff reveals his firm conviction that Milton is a poet with a forceful and vital mes-

sage for modern democracy. One wishes that the message might find a wider hearing than just that among the fit audience though few.

FRENCH R. FOGLE

Barnard College

Robert Boyle—Devout Naturalist. A Study in Science and Religion in the Seventeenth Century. By MITCHELL SALEM FISHER. Philadelphia, Oshiver Studio Press, 1945. 184 pp. $2.50.

The seventeenth century in England had a glory. In it extremes met, clung together for a time, and drifted apart. In politics, in religion, in science, it was a century of fumbling for a path that was to lead to peaceful development, and that did in fact, though the men of the seventeenth century could scarcely have surmised it, lead to the age of reason and enlightenment. It was a century of contradictions; the Cromwellian protectorate followed the Stuart absolutism of the first Charles, and was followed in its turn by a renewal of absolutism. The protectorate itself faced the challenge of the radical left-wing of Diggers and Levellers. Yet the end of the century saw conflict resolved into the relatively placid waters of limited monarchy. Anglicanism met the challenge of Presbyterianism and nonconformity with executions, the lopping off of ears and tongues, imprisonment, and the burning of heretics and their books. The established church developed its cruel Laud; the dissenters their fanatic Prynne; while "radical" religion produced the saintlike Biddle and the patient Fox. The airiest of the Cavalier poets produced religious essays in his leisure; another of the "Cavaliers" was a country parson. Devout piety was near the surface; it showed its head in the strangest places. Seventeenth century science produced its attested cures of wounds by the "sympathetic powder" of Sir Kenelm Digby and its mathematico-magical formulae in the Paracelsan maunderings of Robert Fludd, in addition to its Royal Society (of which Digby was an early member), its discovery of the circulation of the blood, its development of mathematical and experimental method, separately and in combination, its Newton, and its Boyle. There were charlatans aplenty and naturalists aplenty, and the seventeenth century had even less than we, the ability to tell them apart.

In this welter of confused and confusing essays towards truth, it was the special province of Robert Boyle, as Dr. Fisher shows in this interesting book, to develop the experimental aspect of scientific method. Galileo had proposed a method which was to be a combination of mathematics and experiment. Some later scientists, like Descartes, tended to emphasize the rational, mathematical side of scientific method with little or no concern for experiment. Others dabbled in experiment; a few, like Harvey, made much of precise observation and careful classification. Boyle's emphasis on experiment supplied a needed corrective and paved the way for later Newtonian developments, because "under the pressure of his earnest mind and eager hand, experimentalism became exact, precise, respectable . . . ceased to be fortuitous dabbling . . . followed by garrulous if ingenious speculation. He made experimentalism mechanical" (p. 12).

This same Robert Boyle, this careful and competent experimenter, was a devout and loyal member of the Anglican Church. He could not accept as ultimate the natural religion which satisfied other scientists. For him the religion developed in consonance with science could only be "the bridge to, not the sheltered country of enduring faith." He tried to explain all the phenomena of the world mechanically, without using the "substantial forms" of the Schoolmen; but his mechanical explanation was superimposed upon a faith in a living God, who had created the world, whose power and wisdom continually sustained it. His God was not a mere mathematico-mechanical hypothesis, but a vital and necessary truth, lying behind and at the root of all explanation. Man's reason, weak and limited as it is, cannot go very far without the aid of revelation. "The proper duty and office of reason is not to teach us supernatural things; but first to lead us to a supernatural teacher, that is, to God; and next to defend the things He teaches against the unjust imputation of being contradictious and impossible" (Boyle, *Christian Virtuoso*, quoted by Fisher, p. 126).

The limits Boyle placed upon human reason were the limitations of Boyle as a scientific philosopher. Dr. Fisher finds that "Boyle left fundamentals to faith, because he did not want any extended search for metaphysical realities to interfere with the detailed, laborious, and perspicacious task of examining phenomena, and secondly, because as a religious Anglican he wanted to leave faith supported by, but finally above investigation of the mechanical world" (p. 134).

Dr. Fisher has analyzed Boyle's works with great care to establish both his scientific and his religious views. He has written an account of these views and their interpenetration which is lucid, interesting, and informed. He has made a clear case for both the naturalism and the devoutness of Boyle in terms both of the man himself and the century in which he lived. He has entered most sympathetically into the problems Boyle faced and successfully makes clear in what sense these were problems. Altogether he has made a good and valuable contribution to our understanding of the conflicting currents of the seventeenth century.

Joseph L. Blau

Columbia University

The Catholic Apostolic Church, Sometimes Called Irvingite: A Historical Study. By P. E. Shaw. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. viii, 264 pp. $3.25.

The Catholic Apostolic Church, for convenience called Irvingite, is of considerably greater interest than its small numbers might suggest. Its development offers interesting parallels to early Christian history, and in various ways it has been both an inspiration and a warning to others. By its own principles it has been destined to extinction since 1901, when the last of its apostles passed away, since which time it has lacked the power of ordination. Dr. Shaw has performed a most useful service in producing this careful and sympathetic study of the movement while it still survives.

His book naturally begins with the strange career of Edward Irving --Presbyterian minister, popular preacher in London, millenarian, herald of the revival of prophecy and apostolate. With his apocalypticism he combined the Catholic and ritualistic note which soon became so prominent. In the last year of his life, 1833-34, he was subordinate to the new authorities which he had himself called into being; deposed by the Presbytery of Annan, he accepted reordination from J. B. Cardale, the first of the new apostles. Shaw's comments on his personality and influence are judicious and fair. He describes the organization of the movement in Great Britain and the Continent, with emphasis on the new apostolate and the liturgy which was developed in

1832-52. The enigmatic Cardale is the central figure of this period; his domineering personality attracted some and repelled others—a former Anglican layman with ritualistic interests, he was mainly responsible for a great shift in emphasis, though he cannot be said to have contributed any definitely new ideas. Since his death in 1877, there has been officially no development in the Catholic Apostolate Church, and since 1901, it has had no history except one of waiting in silence for the will of the Lord.

Having treated the British history topically, Dr. Shaw takes up the American history of the Catholic Apostolic Church biographically. In this section he has written the first account of the subject, largely from scattered or unavailable sources. The main centers were Toronto, New York, and Hartford, and in the first and last the leaders of the Catholic Apostolic Church in its active days were men of outstanding quality. As Professor of Church History at the Hartford Theological Seminary, Dr. Shaw was in touch with memories and records of the Hartford group, several of whom were former Congregational ministers. As he points out, Irvingism began in America as one of the responses to the confused spiritual longings of the 1840's. In a strange combination, it resembled the Mormons in its announcement of a new revelation, the millenarians in its message that the end was at hand, and the Tractarians in its offer of a more sacramental and churchly religion. The reviewer found this topical and biographical narrative a little confusing as an account of just what happened when; but it is probably as good an approach as could be used in writing the annals of a body which has never particularly cared to have any history.

Finally, Shaw gives a careful survey of the doctrine, worship, and discipline of the Catholic Apostolic Church, and then his own comments and conclusions. In Appendices he reprints three useful documents—the "American Angels' Testimony" of 1858, which gives a summary of doctrine, the General Rubrics of the Eucharistic Liturgy, with ceremonial directions (1878), and a syllabus of religious instruction (apparently in current use, no date given). For those who may wish to study its teaching and practice in detail, Shaw's treatment is an excellent introduction to the publications of the Catholic Apostolic Church and its leaders. But, as a general outline and sound appreciation, he has written what may well remain the final word. As a record of Irvingism his book is enriched by a few useful illustrations—Irving

in his pulpit, the apostles in conclave, the central church in Gordon Square, London, and portraits of American leaders.

To the historian, the Catholic Apostolic Church is interesting as a parallel to early Christian history and as one response to the religious needs of the nineteenth century. Its development from a charismatic, eschatological, and prophetic movement to a sacramental, dogmatic, and hierarchical church repeated, many would say, the pattern of early Christian history. Perhaps even more striking than the main stream is the German and German-American secession of the New Apostolic Church, which has recognized that if you have apostles you might as well have an apostolic succession and perhaps even a papacy—in this case the *Stammapostolat,* "based on the prominence and pre-eminence of Peter in the New Testament period" (p. 100). In its own time the movement offered both the emotional security of millenarianism and the sense of corporate Christianity of the Catholic revival. Much of its history is a parallel, almost a caricature, of the revivals of churchmanship of which the Oxford movement is the most conspicuous example. After all, Cardale came out of an environment not unlike Newman's, and Irving from the same background as Chalmers. Shaw is certainly right in stressing the Presbyterian sources of Irvingism: the Irvingite Angel, who is pastor and bishop of a local congregation and is assisted by elders and deacons but has no power to ordain, is suggestive of a Presbyterian minister, and there is sound Calvinist authority for contemplating a new dispensation of apostles and evangelists as at least possible. The ritual and ceremonial development is at first startling, but the Church of Scotland, as well as the Church of England, has seen a liturgical revival in the last century, and some of its leaders have greatly admired the Irvingite liturgy. In some ways this liturgy of the 1840's anticipated later liturgical studies and projects, as in its stress on adoration in the eucharistic prayer (another point of the same kind was the emphasis in the apostolic "sealing," which corresponded to confirmation, on the building up of the Church rather than on the benefit conferred on the individual). It claimed not only excellence but inspiration, in spite of which the reviewer must admit that much of it seems to him turgid and disorderly, and, like some other projects of the Irvingite apostles, suggestive of a group of Victorian gentlemen playing church. With all the sympathetic interest which the movement deserves, its great defect, as Shaw points out,

was its limited mission. At all periods it was satisfied to gather and comfort the elect and felt no great urge to benefit the world or to preach the gospel to the poor. There is an obvious contrast in this respect to the devotion to home and foreign missions of the Anglo-Catholics in England and the Free Church in Scotland, both movements which sprang in part from the same soil and similarly challenged the nineteenth century with vigorous revivals of historic Christian teaching. It is due to this failure of mission, more than anything else, that a body which has refused to consider itself anything but a part of the Catholic Apostolic Church is best known to the outside world as the Irvingite sect.

E. R. Hardy, Jr.

Berkeley Divinity School

The Theology of Charles Gore: A Study in Modern Anglican Theology. By Ragnar Ekström. Lund: C. W. Gleerup, 1944. xii, 300 pp. 10 kr.

Charles Gore (1853-1932) was representative of an era during which theologians wrestled with the problem of the relation between Christian faith and natural science, biblical criticism, and modern sociological thought. His editorship, in 1889, of the essays entitled *Lux Mundi* definitely marked him as one of the liberal group. His liberalism, however, is not to be confused with the general theological liberalism of the time as represented by Matthew Arnold or expressed in the *Essays and Reviews* of 1860. Rather, Gore thought of himself as a "Liberal Catholic," standing for freedom in thought yet convinced of the truths of Catholicism. In his writings subsequent to *Lux Mundi,* particularly those which appeared following his resignation from the bishopric of Oxford in 1919, he developed further this particular type of theological liberalism. Before his death he had come, in a special way, to be the spokesman and spiritual leader of those who, holding to a "Catholicism combined with modern scientific and social thought demarcated from Romanism on the one hand and modernism on the other," considered themselves and were considered "normal Anglican theologians."

Dr. Ekström's thesis, in this study of the theology of Gore, is that the two basic factors in Gore's thought—liberalism and Catholicism, or modern thought and orthodoxy—created a tension between Gore's

orthodox intention and the carrying out of his theology. Gore's theological *intention* was to develop a Liberal Catholicism opposed as much to a narrow orthodoxy as to a type of radicalism that questioned things which, according to Gore, could not be questioned. This intention, Dr. Ekström maintains, was checkmated by Gore's open-mindedness to new currents in theology, philosophy, and natural science. This modern thought, particularly in theology and philosophy, had a definite content. Open-mindedness toward it (as expressed, for example, in the philosophies of Maurice and Green to which Gore's thought was closely related) implied a theological position assumed under its guidance—a position considerably removed from orthodoxy. The result, states Ekström, "is a clear inconsistency (in Gore's theology) between intention and result. Ultimately, it is Liberalism, not Catholicism, that conquers all along the line" (p. 285).

The five chapters of the book present a thorough treatment of Gore's thought and its background. Chapter I deals with Gore's doctrine of incarnation. Developed against the background of evolutionary thought and the philosophy of emergence, the doctrine became one of "incarnational evolution." Rightly assuming that this is the key to the whole of Gore's theology, Ekström proceeds to analyze the epistemology resulting from this, and the relation between reason and revelation that follows in turn from the epistemology. Chapter II considers the concepts that constitute man's rational knowledge of God. These prove to be the trinity of values—truth, moral goodness, and beauty—comprehension of which Gore holds to be the final end of the universal process. In this connection the author examines Gore's idea of the good as expressed in the life and free development of the personality, and the realization of a social order making this possible. The remaining three chapters Ekström conceives of as constituting an explication of Chapters I and II. Chapter III ("God, World, and Man") reveals the importance of the incarnation and value-perspective for Gore's consideration of the image of God and of man's nature and destiny. Chapter IV ("Christology and Atonement") draws the Christological consequences of the ideas in the first two chapters and clarifies Gore's idea of atonement and his concept of faith. Finally, Chapter V reviews the relation of the incarnation doctrine to Gore's idea of the Church ("an extension of the incarnation") and his views regarding the sacraments.

Dr. Ekström repeatedly illustrates the lack of cohesion between Gore's orthodoxy and the philosophy resulting from his evolutionary point of view. Gore's epistemology, which finds in nature a rational principle which becomes conscious in man, and which seems to give to rational knowledge the last word, is found to conflict with his view of revelation when Gore wrestles with the problem of the *authoritative right* of revelation (pp. 67 ff.). So, too, inconsistencies are found in Gore's attempt to demonstrate the orthodox view of God as Transcendent Creator while, at the same time, subscribing to the philosophy of emergence (pp. 144-54), and, in his Christology, wherein he seeks while holding to his fundamental view of incarnation to maintain the orthodox position of the uniqueness and finality of Christ (pp. 174 ff.). Other and similar inconsistencies are indicated throughout the book. In this reviewer's judgment the author has ably defended his thesis. Incisive as is his criticism, Ekström is withal appreciative. "Gore's theology," he concludes, "is not without a certain grandeur. . . . And it has—partly, perhaps, as a result of its inconsistencies,—maintained the consciousness of the Anglo-Catholic faith that in a given situation (determined by ideas of humanisn and evolution) was the only possible one" (p. 286).

The scholarship of the book is trustworthy and thorough. One criticism: it is surprising that the author takes such a cursory view of Gore's social theory in so far as this was concerned with the objective historical forces in the society of his time. Ekström devotes only nine pages (pp. 109-12, 119-25) to the relation of Gore's thought to that group of ideas called Christian Socialism, and of these nine pages the last six merely summarize the contributions made earlier by certain Tractarians and Maurice. Yet for over nine years Gore was president of the Christian Social Union, much of the inspiration among Anglican churchmen for seeking to understand what Gore himself called the "social aspect of the sacraments" stemmed from him, and his book *Christ and Society* (to which this reviewer found only three references) was neither the earliest nor the least important of his many publications. Aside from this criticism, as a clarification of Gore's theological thought the study is excellent. Throughout the reader is impressed by the author's clear exposition of what, because of its eclectic nature, is not a wholly systematic body of thought.

Presented for the degree of Doctor of Theology at the University of

Lund, the book unfortunately bears some of the marks of this particular type of scholarship. It is documented to the point of pedantry (there are 1180 notes to 288 pages of text) and gives as background material briefs of the philosophies of Bradley, Green, Pringle-Pattison, Alexander, and others, which, considering the public to which such a study is limited, would seem unnecessary. As a candidate for a degree, however, Ekström is probably not to be blamed for seeking to forestall all possible criticisms by an exacting doctoral committee.

CYRIL K. GLOYN

Occidental College

Religion in the Struggle for Power. By J. MILTON YINGER. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1946. xix, 275 pp. $3.00.

Books on the Sociology of Religion are to be welcomed, and when one deals with the relation of religion to the struggle for power it is doubly welcome in these days, for light is direly needed. The author of this book, however, eschews all effort to discover and set forth the role of any dynamic of religion. He makes no attempt to "forge all links in the chain of causation," and sets out on what he calls an "empirical" study. "Driven back upon the concept of religion, we take it as a given, offering only this brief and very general definition: Religion is the attempt to bring the relative, the temporary, the disappointing, the painful things in life into relation with what is conceived to be permanent, absolute, and cosmically optimistic." As a "study in power" Mr. Yinger's work "raises the question: How much influence does religion exercise over the behavior of men? How much, in the competition with other powers, is it able to control behavior *in accordance with its own standards?* . . . How well does it succeed in *accomplishing its own stated ends?*" These stated questions give a clear indication of the general limits of Mr. Yinger's work. More particularly he is aware that the applications of his concepts are "developed only with relation to Christian organizations" (and to "religious groups only as human institutions") but feels that Weber's work, from which he departs slightly, has shown certain universal applicability.

The religious man of the Western world as a member of a religious group is faced with a dilemma:

> If the religious group demands too much allegiance to the religious ideal particularly in spheres which require sacrifices of things held dear in a particular society, it comes into conflict with secular powers and is either persecuted or neglected. On the other hand, of course, if it does not make demands on behavior in terms of its norms it is also without influence. The dilemma is to keep in a position of power without sacrificing the goals for which the power was originally desired.

Mr. Yinger has worked out a typology of religious groups in terms of the power of a group to achieve "purely religious ends," and applies his central concepts to four areas of study: The Reformation, Calvinism and the Rise of Capitalism, the Economic Ethics of Contemporary Churches, and the Churches and War. Sects are characterized by their challenge of the world and its interests, and are ranged according to the degree of withdrawal from the dominant social pattern; the Churches are characterized by the acceptance of the dominant social pattern and ranged according to the degree of "acceptance of the world." The conclusion that Mr. Yinger reaches is that, though the religious interest is thoroughly entwined with secular interests and needs, "It would appear that religion maximizes its power as an agent in social change when church and sect tendencies are combined by some sort of organizational principle."

In short, there is not only the fact of the dilemma, but, secondly, there are typical responses and an ideal response to the above dilemma. Thirdly, Mr. Yinger has sought to show why some religious groups choose radical challenge and some compromise. In his studies he shows, for example, *that* disinherited groups find compromise obnoxious as "one would expect" and hence "are among the sources of religious division." But he does not show *why* some disinherited groups accept the World. This is not unimportant, for Mr. Yinger seeks to set his typology up as the basis of, at least, rough prediction.

Fundamentally Mr. Yinger's position rests upon his acceptance of the purely religious idea working in history though intertwined with secular interests, and his further acceptance of the "relative natural law." He realizes, in his terms, that "religion is only one of man's interests, and not a dominating one in the lives of most people." But,

though religious groups cannot simply direct history with pronouncements or declarations of policies, they can help prepare the breakdown of hampering traditional barriers in society and the emergence of new forces, and they can mitigate the harshness of existing social structures and the brutality of the newly dominating forces. Actually Mr. Yinger makes certain modifications of Weber's doctrine and further tones down Troeltsch's reliance on the purely religious idea working in history, but his whole theory of the relation of religion and power grows out of his acceptance of the dualisms of sacred and secular, relative and absolute, temporary and permanent, disappointing and optimistic, etc., embodied in his "very general definition" of religion, which makes it impossible to get a universal historical application or, in some instances, an application to contemporary group behavior. What we have here is not at all a "very general definition" of religion, in the sense of its being comprehensive, but a definition that is virtually a theological position, and it is, I believe, at least a matter of interest and, perhaps, as one is wont to say, "not accidental" that Mr. Yinger has very considerable recourse to the work of Reinhold Niebuhr in working out his position. In fact, it may be said that sociologically this book probably brings forth nothing fundamentally new. Its interest lies rather in the reassurance it provides to religious (really Christian) workers that religious institutions, as Mr. Yinger (and Mr. Niebuhr) conceive them, have a constructive role to play both in the world and over against those "secular" social institutions which also embody the power factor and are likewise objects of human interest, and how this role may best be conceived. The work, in short, presents one view of the problem of religion and the struggle for power. One could, I believe, more effectively understand the total problem if the above cramping dualisms were dropped, as not determinative of religion, or perhaps radically revised in their interpretation and application to the history of religion. That is, we still have not yet come to the position of asking how men actually act when they act religiously in a world of competing and conflicting interests and institutions that point and circumscribe the pursuit of such interests, for not all groups acting religiously, nor all distinctively religious groups, act in terms of the dualisms that set the limits to Mr. Yinger's work. Perhaps this is but to say that the title is misleading. Within the scope of theory where dualisms are operative the book

will be helpful to those who continue their work within the framework of the dualisms suggested. Those who find these dualisms of little value in understanding religion, will gain less from Mr. Yinger's study and will feel that a work bearing the title of Mr. Yinger's book will require a wider conceptual analytic basis than Mr. Yinger has provided.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

The University of Kansas City

Language and Myth. By ERNST CASSIRER. Translated by SUSANNE K. LANGER. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1946. x, 103 pp. $2.00.

"Professor Cassirer's great thesis," writes Mrs. Langer in her translator's preface, "is that *philosophy of mind involves much more than a theory of knowledge; it involves a theory of prelogical conception and expression, and their final culmination in reason and factual knowledge*" (p. x). This little volume, an excellent English translation of Cassirer's *Sprache und Mythos,* originally published in 1925 as Number VI of the *Studien der Bibliothek Warburg,* provides the English reader, both lay and expert, with some insight into the fundamental position of Cassirer on the subject of linguistic forms and their significance for the self-interpretation of man. *Language and Myth* provides what may, not incorrectly, be called an introduction to Cassirer's earlier volume, *An Essay on Man.*

It should, I believe, be noted at the outset that Cassirer's position has often seemed extremely subtle and somewhat difficult to grasp, both to those who had contact with him personally, and to those who were acquainted with him through his enormous published writings. That there is much truth in this is shown in the small volume before us. However, the charge of subtlety, if indeed it be a charge, is usually brought against most people who break new ground, philosophic or otherwise, partly because new ideas and ways of viewing the world and human experience require industry and patience of us, for we must first understand before we begin the task of critical analysis and evaluation. Our difficulties over new conceptions follow, more often than not, from our reluctance to do the first, and our frenzied haste

to be at the second. Another difficulty is, no doubt, due to the fact that there exists among philosophers what amounts to a virtual blind spot where the philosophy of Kant is concerned.

There are many points raised in the book, but it seems best to set forth the main contention before going on to say something of the merits and difficulties of the position. Cassirer is concerned in this study primarily with the ultimate connection between language and myth, and he attempts to throw light on this connection by the presentation and analysis of a wealth of mythological and religious forms. He rejects as circular those theories which claim to explain myth, and the forms of religious conception in general, by appealing to conditions which presuppose[1] the world of objects, however that world may be defined by the most precise knowledge. Cassirer vigorously denies the possibility of understanding the meaning and function of myth as a great human symbolic activity as long as we attempt to achieve this by employing concepts designed for the express purpose of apprehending the world in a strictly theoretical fashion. If we begin by assuming that the world of "objects" which has been revealed by our present most precise knowledge is the only and ultimate criterion of meaning and truth, we shall inevitably be forced to regard the record of man's self-interpretation, as it appears in language, art, religion and history, as meaningless because concerned with a world essentially unreal. According to Cassirer, we must abandon the attempt to interpret myth through its origins or through a discovery of the real objects which it is supposed to represent.

Myths, and indeed all symbolic forms, are to be understood and measured in their own terms and not by reference to "something extraneous which is supposed to be reproduced in them" (p. 8). Even if we succeeded, Cassirer notes, in explaining mythical speech as having been produced by certain objects or types of objects in the natural environment, we should be faced with the difficult and more interesting philosophic question of the actual insight into man and his world

1. *"Presuppose"*—this term has an important place in Cassirer's thought, as it also had in Kant's, and there is admittedly some difficulty connected with its meaning. It seems unwise, in this context, to take it in the strict sense as when "B presupposes A" is taken to mean that "from A, B logically follows." The term is rather to be taken in a sense which is at least quasi-temporal, as when a philosopher proposes to investigate the grounds of error and we say that he *presupposes* that error is actual, and that its occurrence is not in question.

provided by mythical thought itself. Thus to capture the "real" objects behind mythological forms is beside the point, or as Cassirer puts this, "it is not a question of what we see in a certain perspective, but of the perspective itself" (p. 11). Cassirer would attack the problem of myth by considering it primarily as an illustration of the specifically human symbolic function, as one of the many ways in which man attempts to understand his world and interpret his existence. The close connection between myth and language, noted above as of great importance, touches the central point of Cassirer's theory. If we turn to the world of mythology, he maintains, we come face to face with the problem of original linguistic forms at a level which does *not* presuppose the full and final articulation of the world of nature in a language which possesses the abstractness and precision characteristic of a scientific speech. "It is here," he writes, concerning the vivid and concrete character of myth, "in this intuitive creative form of myth, and not in the formation of our discursive theoretical concepts, that we must look for the key which may unlock for us the secrets of the original conceptions of language" (p. 34). The circularity of most theories of mythical speech, as we noted above, consist, according to Cassirer, in their presupposing a world of ready-made objects, thus rendering an understanding of a distinct perspective existing prior to such a world quite impossible. A consideration of the mythological consciousness enables us to approach the problem of understanding the roots of language in an atmosphere free from the characteristics of a later conception of natural objects which could not possibly have influenced such linguistic forms.

A further point raised here by Cassirer is the place of a "philosophy" as distinct from, let us say, a history of symbolic forms. Philosophy, he maintains, must content itself with an "insight into the determining and discriminating function, which myth as well as language performs in the mental construction of our world of things" (p. 15), and it must look to philology and comparative mythology to supply the picture of the historical process *in concreto*. Does this mean, however, that we are left, in our attempt to understand myth and religion, with nothing else than the *history* of linguistic and religious forms? In a good Kantian spirit, Cassirer answers, no, it is not the same thing to know the genesis of ideas as to know their ultimate meaning. A philosophic approach involves a logical analysis of religious conception in

order to apprehend the structure, the form (λόγος) of the type of ideation present in the world of myth, and to distinguish this from the world of process of concept formation in the most accurate scientific thought.

Scientific thought is "discursive," according to Cassirer, since the particular data are used as points of departure from which, ultimately, a unified system of relations is to be formed. The aim of careful theoretical knowledge is to move from sensuous immediacy in order to arrive at systematic relations obtaining between phenomena. Mythical thinking, on the contrary, "is captivated and enthralled by the intuition which suddenly confronts it. It comes to rest in the immediate experience" (p. 32). In the case of the religious consciousness, the content of immediate experience "possesses" the subject, since he is related to that content in the most intimate way, and the course of his existence depends upon it. In the spiritual crisis, that which bears in a unique[2] fashion upon the extraordinary aspects of life is set aside as "holy" and distinct from the "profane" (the "always manifest"). Religious conception does not rest here, however, but undergoes a development of its own. Unfortunately, space does not permit us to follow Cassirer's very revealing analysis of the "successive phases of religious thought," the most important section of the book, in which he traces the development of religious thought from the particularity or indeterminateness of "momentary deities" to the true generality of monotheism (pp. 62-83). With the foregoing statement of his position we must be content, and it remains to say something of the values and difficulties of this position, albeit briefly.

Both points to be discussed here are based on the preceeding exposition. First, there is the danger of Cassirer's thought falling into "subjectivism" of a vicious sort, and following from this, the problem of the adequacy of an epistemological approach or emphasis on the "form" of the symbolic activity. Cassirer never did depart from the philosophy of Kant as he understood it (and American philosophers should remember the extent of his knowledge on this subject before venturing a word), and, for this reason, he was always critical of the so-called "realist" approach. However, Cassirer uses language which often suggests the purely factitious character of the mythical and re-

2. At this crucial point (p. 32 ff.), i.e., the point where the character of the "religious" is under discussion, Cassirer unfortunately fails to be explicit.

ligious worlds. Language is said to "posit" and "realize" the actualities of the religious consciousness, and the world of the gods seems always to be on the verge of being taken as of human manufacture. This causes great difficulty for his position, since it is but a step to the conclusion that the realities indicated by myth and religion are "nothing but" figments of imagination, which is precisely the position he rejects and attempts to combat. I would not suggest at this point that we fall back on a justification of myth by arguing for the existence of the so-called "objects" involved. Cassirer is correct in rejecting this line of defense, but having put aside such a basis, the question is, can we maintain the reality of the religious conceptions on epistemological grounds alone? I am inclined to believe that we cannot. Nor is it possible to dispense with this question by claiming to confine our attention to the "form" only.

Logical analysis of the form of ideation, such as Cassirer carried on, is a powerful and indespensible instrument which enables us to understand much that would otherwise never be considered at all valuable. It has a very important critical value which becomes evident when we have to deal with the dogmatic claims of those who pretend to possess "objective" and "scientific" knowledge in matters of ethical and religious concern, but whether this critical and largely formal analysis is a sufficient basis upon which to rest the reality of the religious concern remains questionable. It has often been pointed out, and I think with truth, that the positive elements of Kant's philosophy showed a reintroduction of a metaphysical point of view, although with an anthropological rather than cosmological orientation. Such a metaphysical foundation seems necessary for the philosophy of symbolic forms, since sooner or later the question must arise, what is it that is revealed through these forms beside the fact that they are symbolic activities which, as such, tell us something of the nature of mind? The specific content of these human symbolic activities must be dealt with. I do not see how a philosophic theory can neglect what is apprehended, the content, and be satisfied with confining itself to the "form." This point bears some further discussion beyond the scope of a review.

A vote of thanks is due Mrs. Langer for her translation. There can be no doubt that her own competence in the field of the analysis of symbols aided her materially in this work.

There are several typographical errors, as follows: δάφυη for δάφνη

(p. 5); ταῖυ for ταῖν (p. 6); λογος for λόγος (p. 15). A question occurs as to whether the point made by Cassirer (p. 4) about the similarity between the Greek words for "men" and "stones" is not illustrated more readily when the masculine form λᾶος is used for "stone" instead of the feminine λᾶας, which is used in the original edition (German edition, p. 3).

JOHN E. SMITH

Barnard College

Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought: Collected Essays on the Traditional or "Normal" View of Art. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. London: Luzac and Co., 1946. 256 pp. 10*s*, 6*d*.

Readers of the many previous books on art by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy will recognize in this latest collection of articles a continuation of his learned protest against the contemporary tradition of art appreciation. Though the titles of the essays in this book might lead one to believe that a large variety of subjects is treated, the texts are, with few exceptions, a set of variations on one persistent theme: the danger of the present-day deviation from the "traditional" or "normal" view of art as a useful and meaningful activity within a culture.

The title essay is an attempt to show that the "aesthetic" interpretation of art represents a radical departure from the classical Greek, Christian medieval, and classical Oriental manner of viewing the nature and function of art, and that the great works of these traditions can be fully understood only by conceiving of them as a kind of "rhetoric," or communication of "theses." This view is fortified in the second article, "The Medieval Theory of Beauty," in which he presents his own translation and explication of extracts on art and beauty from Dionysius Areopagiticus, Ulrich Engelberti, and Thomas Aquinas, and indicates the similarity of their positions to Indian theories of art. The latter work of historical interpretation is reversed in "The Intellectual Operation in Indian Art," and "The Nature of Buddhist Art," in which he offers an examination of the Vedic and Buddhist conceptions of the artistic endeavor, and points out similarities with the medieval Christian view. In the essay called "Ornament," he presents a series of arguments to show that the contemporary notion of

ornamentation as a source of aesthetic satisfaction is untenable on philological and historical grounds. Finally, to mention only one other essay in this connection, that on Shaker furniture aims to show how the non-aesthetic approach to art was used by an American religious sect, with resultant vigor in artistic expression.

As a source of unequivocal criticism of the modern "isolationist" tradition in art, this book will find many interested readers. Yet even those sympathetic with the general bent of Dr. Coomaraswamy's thesis will take issue with the specific form it takes in this work, and with the arguments used in its defense. For example, the author, in his condemnation of the "aesthetic attitude," shows a lack of understanding of both the popular and technical conceptions of the term "aesthetic." Using philology propagandistically, he equates "aesthetic" with "sentimental" (having to do with "that part of our psychic makeup that senses"!) and states that aesthetic reactions are "nothing more than the biologist's 'irritability' which we share with the amoeba." When he says, too, that aesthetic pleasures are "irrational, bestial, and, in the worst sense of the term, seductive and distracting," he is, to say the least, presenting an exaggerated conception of the passive aesthete's attitude. Moreover, that this pathological view of aesthetic experience is not that of many writers on aesthetics today could be learned from a glance at the work of Santayana, Dewey, or Prall.

In his enthusiastic defense of a conception of art as a conveyor of metaphysical theses, the author also discloses a blindness not only to the epistemological problems involved in such a stand, but to the possibility of art's serving more than one function within a culture. The ability of the modern aesthetic observer to take delight in the formal construction and emotive expression in the *Divine Comedy* while remaining neutral to the "doctrine" is interpreted by Dr. Coomaraswamy not as evidence of intellectual refinement but as a kind of schizophrenia. In his refusal to include within the category of "true art" works which simply express emotion he outdoes one of his favorite masters, Plato, who tolerated the sensuous expression of "good" and "harmless" feelings. The single track thesis of Coomaraswamy is that the artist's function is "not simply to please, but to present an ought-to-be-known in such a manner as to please . . . ," and there is no swerving from this doctrinaire path throughout the essays.

Disappointing, too, in a book that aims ostensibly at the criticism of the "modern European tradition" in art, is an almost complete absence of specific reference to works of Western art dated later than the Middle Ages. One might expect, after reading this author's denunciation of realistic art, and his appreciative interpretation of the profound metaphysical import of the "abstract art" of Oriental and primitive societies, that a recognition of the expressive values of the non-realistic art of modern Europe would be forthcoming. Instead, we are presented with such an arbitrary generalization as, "Our abstract art is not an iconography of transcendental forms, but the realistic picture of a disintegrated mentality." In other words, while Dr. Coomaraswamy finds it easy to interpret the appearance of a safety pin as a "symbol of regeneration," he would relegate the work of Kandinsky, Klee, or Mirò—often explicitly presented by the artist as of extra-aesthetic significance—to the realm of "insane art."

It is perhaps impertinent, however, to search for relevance to the secular art of complex modern civilization in this book. The author himself tells us that "normal" art, expressive of the "eternal verities," can arise only in a "traditional" society, in which "the life of the community as a whole and that of the individual conforms to recognized patterns of which no one questions the validity." Until such a state of ideal social simplicity is attained, art "abnormal" in Coomaraswamy's view will be the rule. Meanwhile, it is hoped that, in later books, his suggestions for cultural therapy will be more specific than his present "reorganization of society on the basis of vocation."

ARTHUR SZATHMARY

Columbia University

Sous les yeux de l'incroyant. By JEAN LEVIE. (2nd ed.) Paris: Desclée de Brouwer; Bruxelles, L'Édition Universelle, 1946. 300 pp. 90 fr. belg.

The author, a professor of Holy Scripture at the Jesuit Theological College of Louvain, has indicated in his title the guiding idea of his book. Intense Catholic conviction examines itself here under the unbeliever's eyes. The foundations of belief and the problems of honest unbelief confront each other. The author is forbearing with his hon-

est unbeliever, for he is convinced that his own foundations are firm.

The first part of the book is entitled "Intellectual Sincerity and Submission of Faith." The basis of belief is in sound reason: in the sound reasons of faith and in sound reason itself, seeking faith. Catholic apologetics does not rest its case on any one fact or document or miracle. Its strength is in its synthesis of evidence, reasonable and convincing to fair inquiry (pp. 21, 48): the historical documents, the Savior's own testimony, his miracles, his resurrection, his holiness and his teaching sustaining each other, the raison d'être of his human-divine character and mission as the center and meaning of our universe. Sound thinking proceeds to belief precisely by being sound and thorough and fully humane. It is a meager soul that is satisfied with agnostic indecision. Deeper insight, broader outlook, higher aspiration all lead us beyond doubt towards the faith in which our intelligence and our hearts find fulfillment. As sound thinking is thus a foundation of belief, belief is the test and final evidence of sound thinking. The heretic errs not through thinking but through thinking insufficiently (pp. 124 f., 132). Catholic belief is in a deeper and fuller self-penetration of Christian intelligence, to attain unto the truth of Christ, of which his Church is the visible and eternal possession. The true Catholic should think his Christian faith; in all non-revealed matters he should think thoroughly, in the perspective of his faith; in all the tasks of common life he should devoutly engage all the powers of his Christian mind and will (pp. 136, 140 ff., 150 ff.).

The second part of the book is entitled "Unbelieving Thought and Christian Thought." The author first makes a resolute effort to judge the unbeliever fairly. He does not ignore the risks in this effort. When a good Catholic discusses objectively the doctrines of his critics and enemies, he may disturb the faith of some of his pious listeners or readers, and he may arouse in others suspicions of his own genuine piety. But these risks must be faced, to advance the truth of Christ. The author here discusses first, the Christian understanding of truth, and second, the Christian's respect for his adversary. Let Christianity penetrate itself to the full, so that it can possess, refine and expand all human ideals, insights, endeavors (p. 162). It is by recognizing whatever sincerity of thought or honesty of doubt or loyalty to truth his critic has that the Christian may lead him, and himself advance, to

the higher sincerity and loyalty of true belief in Christ. Earlier in his book, the author examines the defection of Renan, and later that of Alfred Loisy. He tries to be fair to the personal integrity of both, but his final judgment is, in each case, emphatically negative.

A short chapter on Catholic and Protestant exegesis contains the author's judgment of the millions of imperfect Christians who have lost the essential Catholic truth, the truth of the Christ living and achieved in his Church (p. 175). Negating the Church of Christ and her holy tradition, the Protestants would somehow grope their way across long centuries back to the initial teaching of Jesus. But here they are involved in controversies; their liberal spirit is assailed by doubts; their Christianity is stunted. Against this variety and instability of Protestant speculation, the Catholic must reaffirm his belief in Jesus-continued-by-his-Church, in history and dominating history (p. 190). At this point, many readers may wonder what sort of a chapter our Jesuit author could have included on Roman Catholic exegesis and that of the Eastern Orthodox Churches, and to what final conclusion he could have been led regarding the unique truth of Christian belief.

The third part of the book, on "Divine Verities and Human Narrownesses," contains discussions of doctrinal security and intellectual work, the problem of tradition and progress, secular duties and the primacy of religious duty, ecclesiastical authority in its relation to individual conscience and the free activity of the faithful. The treatment of these problems, as may be surmised, involves a hard test of the author's ability to harmonize alert and growing reasonableness with initially genuine and finally complete loyalty to the supreme authority of the Church.

A fervent epilogue, "I Believe in Jesus Christ," brings the book to a conclusion.

The primary interest of this volume for the more critical student of religion who is likely to read this review is in its expression of a deliberately reasonable Roman Catholic apologetics. The reviewer has used the space at his disposal to give an outline of its main contents and some suggestion of its tone and method of procedure.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF

The Rice Institute

A History of American Philosophy. By HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. xiv, 646 pp. $4.50.

American Philosophical Addresses, 1700-1900. Edited by JOSEPH L. BLAU. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. viii, 762 pp. $6.75.

"Man," says Edward Caird, "is from the first self-conscious and he is continually on the way to become more clearly conscious of himself and all the elements and phases of his being. Slow as may be the movement of his advance, the time must at last come when he turns back in thought upon himself, to measure and to criticise, to select and to reject, to consider and remould by reflexion, the immediate products of his own religious life."

What Caird says of the religious life is true of a culture in its entirety, and is, perhaps even more true of a people as a whole than of a single individual. In any case, "the time has at last come" when America is turning back upon the three hundred years of its immediate past, to review and to reflect upon the immediate products of its life on these shores.

Columbia University, in this meditative mood of remembrance and self-criticism, has embarked, in our behalf, upon a distinguished series of "Studies in American Culture." These studies are to consider aspects of our culture "that are usually neglected in political histories." They are to deal with the Arts and Sciences, Philosophy and Religion, Folkways, Industry and Agriculture. Professors Carman, Curti, Krout, Malone, and Schneider are the board of editors. Their names vouch for the excellence of the series. In particular, we are now indebted to these editors and to their Press for the two substantial volumes in hand. If the essence of art be, in the first instance, a genius for selection, then both of these books are, without intending or professing to be so, aesthetic masterpieces. For a shrewd instinct as to what to omit from the vast wealth of available source material, and a sympathetic treatment of the subject matter chosen and included, are patent to the most casual reader.

Professor Schneider's book must be appraised on the basis of its intention. Above all, it must not be blamed for not being another kind of book than its author has actually written. Professor Schneider is a philosopher, yet, in this instance, he writes, not as an independent sys-

tem-maker, but as a historian of American philosophy in its entirety. The result is a dispassionate review of the reflective thought of our people from the earliest days of New England Congregationalism to these latest days of "pragmatic intelligence" and "empirical radicalism," as represented by James and Dewey.

There are, all told, 660 pages in this volume. The text is broken into eight parts, which represent distinguishable "periods" in the development of our reflective thought. Each of these parts is followed by a "Guide to the Literature." These "guides" require about 95 pages of the volume and are, in turn, supplemented by an index of some 55 pages. Nearly 150 pages are, therefore, "apparatus" pure and simple. A rough estimate seems to yield at least 1,000 proper names of men with whom some sort of reckoning has here been made, or with whom further reckoning might be made.

Even within the text, for which Professor Schneider is immediately responsible, direct quotation usually takes a third of the page and will often run to half a page, if not the full page. It is quite apparent, therefore, what Professor Schneider set out to do, and, indeed, has done. He intended to give us, and has succeeded in giving us, what might be called an "encyclopedia" of American philosophy, and, as was intimated above, he has proved himself an artist in the selection and treatment of his material, rather than an undiscriminating pedant, meticulously recording irrelevant material.

In his personal writing, Professor Schneider has been content to lay the mortar between the blocks of direct quotation, so that the whole edifice holds together as it rises. His part has been to provide the "binder" between the bricks and stones. He does not allow himself direct praise or blame of men and movements on the one hand, neither does he attempt a dispassionate appraisal of the merits or demerits of the thinkers of yesterday. What he does succeed in doing is to persuade us that, despite much discontinuity in other aspects of our life, there has been, in the realm of our philosophy, an interior logic and a consistency which can be discovered when we review the entire record. He shows, as a historian should show, "how things have come to be as they are" in our reflective thinking. Therefore, any given man and his mind are seen, either as the progressive unfolding of the tradition within which he consciously stands, or as an instance of that genius for dissent which has been one of the strongest strains in our temperament.

If, in these matters, Professor Schneider has worked "a miracle of condensation," he has also worked an even more difficult miracle of unification, and has done so without doing violence to his sources in order to make them fit a pre-determined thesis upon which his mind was set.

I venture to suggest that three single pages of the book—pages viii, 225, and 441—when read as a unit, furnish a passkey to the entire book. At least they are the most provocative in the book, precisely because they are Professor Schneider's nearest approach to a personal appraisal of his whole story.

Thus, page viii launches the book with the proposition that "America was intellectually colonial long after it gained political independence and has been intellectually provincial long after it ceased being intellectually colonial. We still live intellectualy on the fringe of European culture." He holds that, as, at the first, we lived off John Locke, so, today, we are inordinately dependent on "intellectual imports from Cambridge, Paris and Vienna." He does not tell us in so many words why this has been so, much less whether he thinks it ought to have been so and to be still so, but he can discover no "isolationism" in American philosophy. There is food for thought here. It may be doubtful whether any European philosopher would have said of a fellow thinker, as was said of Julius Seelye, that he was "the deepest-down-divingest, the longest-under-stayingest, and the greatest up-mud-bringingest of all the writers in philosophy." The indubitable Yankee accent is heard here, but of itself that accent is not enough to alienate us from the Old World.

Again, pages 225 and 441 discuss the metamorphosis by which American philosophy ceased to be a quality in all our sober thinking and became a special field of inquiry, departmentalized within its own academic paddock. Here, again, though the terms of modern life have made of our author a "professionalized philosopher," one seems to read between his lines the suspicion that philosophy was truer to its genius and its vocation when it was "the spirit of the arts and sciences, without being itself distinguished as a particular article of faith or doctrine." In any case, the book is a study of the ways in which "philosophy lost its living connections with the general culture of the American people and became a technical discipline in academic curricula." Given this thesis, the best period of American philosophy would seem to have been that of a century ago, rather than that of to-

day. It may well be, however, that academic philosophy, as represented by men like James and Dewey, has achieved for their technical discipline an independent Americanism which was denied thinkers of the earlier time.

One final word: Professor Schneider has been fair to his heroes in the allotment of space. The number of pages given to the major figures is a rough approximation to their importance in our culture. To this extent our author does evaluate his subjects. As for the rest, we may be grateful that he takes time to remind us of many men whom we had actually forgotten, and of others whom we are in danger of forgetting. Thus, he refreshes our fading memories of the "great generation of near-great philosophers" ushered in with the 80's. He puts such men as Charles Edward Garman and Borden Parker Bowne in their rightful places. He revives the name and celebrates the importance of William Graham Sumner. Or, again, he quotes at length from the elder Henry James a piquant and pertinent passage found in a source not readily accessible. In all these respects the perspective of the book is sound. No would-be philosopher, or student of philosophy, will be able hereafter to discuss American philosophy as a whole without reference to this book. Here are clues to the sources telling us where to look, and citations from the sources to whet our curiosity. This is a welcome book to have always at hand hereafter. We are grateful to Professor Schneider for the patient and discriminating scholarship which it represents.

The collection of addresses which Dr. Blau has edited is intended as a companion volume to Professor Schneider's work. The editor calls it "a closely connected aspect of the same enterprise." Especial note has been taken of "works of literary value," particularly those which are a transcript of some characteristic phase or period of American life.

Professor Schneider asks whether there is an "American philosophy," and answers the question in the negative. Dr. Blau tells us that for the last hundred years we have been asking whether there is an American culture which has yielded a national literature. He is inclined to think that Emerson's *American Scholar* and Wendell Phillips' *Scholar in a Republic,* both of which he includes in his volume, make a case for such a thesis.

The papers which he reprints here reflect the addiction of our people to forensic oratory. Many, if not most, of these chapters were

addresses delivered before college, church, or popular audiences. "All are speculative in nature . . . each is a popularized account of a philosophic outlook." They are a tribute to the intelligence—and also the patience!—of their hearers, as well as to the skill of their authors. Many of the names are classic: Edward Everett, Orestes Brownson, Wendell Phillips, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., Noah Porter, Jonathan Edwards, William Ellery Channing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Horace Bushnell. Others are, perhaps, less well known: Charles Jared Ingersoll, Gulian Verplanck, Willis Hall, Job Durfee, James Woodrow, Theodore Munger. It should be understood that an author has been chosen in the first place, and a selection made from his works in the second place, because of relevance to the general philosophy of American culture or the specific philosophies of science and religion.

Professor Schneider had called attention to the fact that, with Munroe's historic message to Congress, we arrive at a distinct awareness of "the American system." By 1820 Walt Whitman could speak of "the moth-eaten systems of Europe" against which our system could be set in contrast. It is not surprising that the 1820's and 30's produced our first crop of formal historians as successors to the earlier informal diarists: Bancroft, Prescott, Parkman, Motley, *et al.* Their advent marks the fact that we had become fully self-conscious as a people, although not as yet retrospectively self-critical. It is significant that the average year in which twenty-four of these dated addresses or essays appeared is 1842. One is more and more impressed by the fact that somewhere, just about that time, American culture reached, in the realms with which we are here concerned, a zenith that has not been attained a second time, perhaps never can be. It was the era of our most buoyant self-confidence, expressing itself at its vulgar worst as a "barbaric yawp," and at its sober best as the note from the "iron string of self-reliance." Meanwhile, the fact that Dr. Blau's chapters are not merely a reproduction in full of citations which Professor Schneider has made in part, but are independent selections, gives to these paired volumes added value.

Willard L. Sperry

Harvard University

BOOK NOTES

Where the Two Came to Their Father: A Navaho War Ceremonial. Given by Jeff King, text and paintings by Maud Oakes, commentary by Joseph Campbell, silk screen reproductions by Raymond and Raymond (Bollingen Series I). New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1943. 88 pp. 18 color plates. $8.50.

This sumptuously printed example of the extremely numerous song ceremonials of the Navaho is an excellent introduction to an American Indian religious rite for readers who have not yet sampled such material. The ritual was taken down through an interpreter and not in Navaho text, so that it presents fewer difficulties to the English reader than some of the more literal translations; the translation and the commentary are reverent and catch the authentic spirit of Navaho ceremony. Pages from Miss Oakes' diary are given describing her experiences in obtaining the myth and the sand paintings which accompany it, along with the Navaho singers' own commentary. Accompanying the volume is a large folder with colored plates of the rite's eighteen sand paintings, and the significance and the color symbolism of these plates are discussed in the book. The sand paintings of this chant are artistically crude compared to many that have been recorded from the days of Washington Matthews to the present, but they contribute to the understanding of the symbolism of the chant.

"Where the Two Came to Their Father" is a war ritual retelling the myth of the twin culture heroes who killed the monsters which infested this world in the early mythical age. It used to be sung over warriors going out on a raiding party, to identify them ritually with the strength and potency of the divinely born twins. The sand paintings depict scenes from their great quest for power from the Sun, their father, and representations of supernatural sources of strength. The paintings are made with sand, preferably on buckskin, but, if that is too expensive, on the ground. The person for whose benefit the chant is given either sits or stands on the painting and, as he thus blurs the sand lines of the drawing, receives symbolically the strength the Twins obtained in their quest. Since raiding parties have been given up, the chant is used only for curing the sick or disturbed—as the ritual was first used to cure the sickness of the Twins when they had become weak and thin from killing all the monsters. The identification with the Twins of the person for whom the chant is sung is complete, whether the strength sought for enables him to kill an enemy or to recover from rheumatism or bad dreams.

In this version of the widespread story, the monster-killers are not literally twins; they are born eight days apart of separate impregnations of Changing Woman by the rays of the Sun. Their great journey to get power from their father at the edge of the world is made additionally dangerous by Sun's wife's hostility, since she takes their claim to be his sons as evidence of her husband's unfaithfulness to her. The Sun puts them through the usual life-and-death tests, and when they have survived by their power their plea to be given power to kill the monsters still has to overcome Sun's unwillingness—for the

monsters also are his sons. These themes are not found in the usual myth of the monster-killers and are beautifully handled in this version.

The Navaho singer's introductory legend—not part of the ritual—tells a simple and interesting version of the trouble in the underworld when the angry women attempted to live forever separated from the men, the people's ascent to the present world, the first death, and how they fixed up the earth to suit themselves. The theme of man-made creation is exceptionally strong in this version, even for an American Indian myth. The people decide where to put the mountains and which way they will face; they sing them into being out of some sacred shells. To insure "order in their lives," they arrange the sun and moon and the seasons. Then, looking around at the trees and rocks about them, they said, "But we did not plant these, they are causing trouble," so they commissioned a cyclone to overturn them. This theme of the clean slate on which man drew his own diagram of an orderly world is seldom as articulately expresed in myths, but it is a characteristically Navaho theme.

Joseph Campbell's commentary on the legend and ritual is an enthusiastic discussion of parallels in the great world religions to ideas found in the Navaho chant.

RUTH BENEDICT

The World's Great Scriptures: An Anthology of the Sacred Books of the Ten Principal Religions. By LEWIS BROWNE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. xvi, 559 pp. $5.00.

On receiving a new anthology such as this, one always looks through it quickly to see if the compiler has included the right selections, which of course means the selections the reader himself would have included. And usually he is disappointed. How could the editor have included this? How could he have left that out? Probably in the end the anthology tells as much about its compiler as it does about the literatures from which materials are chosen. Facing the problem of choosing what to include, one must determine some principle of selection, and even then two persons operating upon it would differ in what should be included or excluded.

Lewis Browne tells clearly enough what his principle of selection was: "The entire emphasis is on the ethical element in each religion, on the moral laws and social preachments." How well has he chosen on this basis? In the main, very well indeed, though not a little has been included which seems to have little or no ethical reference. In respect to Babylonian writings the principle is well observed—an ethical fragment, a hymn to Shamash, a penitential Psalm, a fragment from the Gilgamish Epic like unto Ecclesiastes, portions of an ancient Babylonian or Assyrian poem depicting a Babylonian Job, and numerous laws from the Code of Hammurabi. From Egypt the Book of Ptah Hotep, and the negative confession from the Book of the Dead are clearly ethical—but the inclusion of the noble hymns to Aton, the monotheistic deity of Ikhnaton, must have been largely on some other basis. The reader is glad that strict adherence to a principle did not cause them to be omitted.

Turning to the Hindu section, it seems not a little strange that of the five hymns of the Rig Veda, four should have come from the late tenth book, and that none of the great hymns to Varuna, most ethical of all the gods, finds a place. Only one of the five may be said to be of much ethical importance. They are great hymns, and worthy of inclusion. They just do not fit the principle. All of which is to indicate that the author has been influenced by other considerations than his announced criteria. This would hold also in his selections from the Upanishads, which are generally speaking not much concerned with ethics.

Like observations might be made at a number of points, but they do not seriously affect the value of the book. It is a good selection on the whole, and one that will prove very useful to the general reader, and to teachers and students of the various religions. One might quibble with the author as to the relative amount of space given to each on the basis of his ethical criterion, but, again, no two individuals would be likely to agree.

A valuable feature of the book is the introductory material provided for each section. This is brief, to the point, and generally speaking adequate for the purpose. The dates given are sometimes matters of controversy, but he usually cites the authority whom he follows. These introductory passages contain some misstatements of fact which are hardly excusable, for example, page 134, where Pali is spoken of as "Buddha's mother tongue," while on page 145 it is said that his language used in his Sermon at Benares was Magadhi. The assertion that Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna were already in existence at the time of Asoka and that he "adopted the more primitive of them," would hardly be recognized as a fact, though there were undoubtedly sectarian groups in existence in his time. Furthermore, while it is true that "the Pali books were formally canonized at the behest of King Asoka," it is certainly not true that the Pali canon as it now exists was completed at so early a date.

An attempt is made to give some idea of the number of followers of the various faiths. Shintoists, Jains, and Sikhs are omitted or not numbered as such, perhaps because no account is taken of them in the anthology. Such estimates the author warns are necessarily uncertain, but there is no reason why Hinduism should be credited with only 230 million followers when the current Indian Year Book reports a total of over 255 million.

But these are relatively minor matters. In so condensed an introduction to each religion inevitably much will be left to be desired. The personal point of view of the author explains in some degree the points of emphasis. For example, the introduction to Christianity will seem to some Chrisitian readers an inadequate statement. However, as a whole it is an excellent and very useful book, in many respects superior to earlier published anthologies. It is well printed, a handsome bit of book-making, altogether worthy of a place on the shelves not only of school and public libraries, but also of individuals who want to know something of the basic religious and ethical thought of the peoples of the world.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

L'Orient et les origines de l'idéalisme subjectif dans la pensée européenne: I. *La doctrine théologique de Memphis.* By ARAM M. FRENKIAN. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1946. 167 pp. 300 fr.

The author is aware of the main problem which besets his inquiry: the profound spiritual difference between the Ancient Egyptians on the one hand, the Greeks and ourselves on the other. He surveys, in his first chapter (pp. 1-41), the literature on the relations of Greek philosophy with the Ancient Near East, and reaches the conclusion (which I consider entirely correct) that the difference between Hellas and the pre-Greek world was too profound for the latter to have contributed anything of decisive importance to "le miracle grec." In the following chapter (pp. 43-104), Frenkian describes the "Memphite Theology," an astonishing Egyptian text, written down in the third millennium B.C. and preserved for us in a copy dated about 700 B.C. It teaches, in a language adapted to a highly concrete mode of thought, a spiritual view of Creation, namely that everything that exists found its origin in the conceptions of the Creator's "heart," conceptions which were objectified through being pronounced by his "tongue." Here, too, the author quotes all the relevant literature, and prints side by side, not only the translations of Erman, Sethe, and Junker, but even those of Breasted and Maspero, which are out of date. His comments show shrewdness and insight. Without being an Egyptologist, he spots the artificiality of Junker's latest interpretation, which seems to be a *hineininterpretieren* of Father Wilhelm Schmidt's *Urmonotheismus* into the Egyptian sources (pp. 66-67). Frenkian also rejects Junker's attempt to evade the difficulty of understanding an alien mentality by considering our text a confused conglomerate of two originally heterogeneous documents (p. 73).

The author continues to consider Greek philosophy before Alexander the Great (in so doing he denies that the Ionians meant by ἀρχή "primordial matter," "sustaining principle," or anything but simple "beginning" [p. 110 f.]), and finally Greek philosophy after Alexander (149-131 B.C.) without, however, reaching Plotinus. And yet, it is Frenkian's study of Plotinus which is the raison d'être of the book under review, for, in Plotinus, Frenkian sees Greek and Egyptian thought united. It may, therefore, be premature to judge the first part of his work, but I am not impressed by the evidence of Egyptian influence on Hellenistic thought produced in the last section of this volume. The Greek magical papyri, which Frenkian quotes, belong to a level of thought entirely distinct from that upon which the Memphite Theology was conceived. Frenkian's comparison of certain features in earlier Egyptian texts with ideas current in Hellenistic times suffer from the distortion which traits lifted out of their cultural context are likely to undergo. When the Egyptians beg passers-by to say a prayer at their tomb and add that this costs the speaker nothing, the last statement is merely an inducement to perform the charitable act, for the "mystic participation" of a name in the essence of the thing named causes a prayer for food and drink to be almost as efficacious as the offering of actual sustenance.

When the Greeks, on the other hand, marvel that words spoken do not

diminish the speaker and light imparted does not diminish the flame, their astonishment, which is not shared by the Egyptians (as Frenkian rightly states), is due to an attitude of mind which is without precedent in the pre-Greek world. The Greeks were preoccupied with the nature of matter and aware of the existence of natural laws. The atmosphere in which these secular questions were discussed differs *toto caelo* from that wherein the Egyptians state that words, although efficacious, cost the speaker nothing. We can but wonder whether the author will succeed in proving in his forthcoming volume that thoughts conceived in Pharaonic Egypt ever affected the Alexandrians who, like ourselves, were separated from the Ancient Egyptians by the development of critical philosophy.

H. FRANKFORT

The New Testament Letters. Prefaced and paraphrased by J. W. C. WAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. 220 pp. $3.00.

The present Bishop of London, who at the time of the first publication of this volume in 1943 was Archbishop of Brisbane, begins his introduction by stating, "The decay of the habit of Bible reading is widely deplored: this volume is a humble effort to restore it." He adds, "But not after the old fashion" of short discontinuous sections; "we should read whole books of the Bible at a sitting." And in order to make such reading possible he has made a new translation "into the kind of language a Bishop might use in writing a monthly letter for his diocesan magazine," in which he "did not shrink here and there from inserting an explanatory phrase or occasionally even a sentence." This translation is then printed in modern style, with many paragraph headings in italics to assist the reader, and with the poetical passages not only set as poetry but often rendered into English rhyming verse.

The general style of the translation may be illustrated for instance by Bishop Wand's version of I Cor. 10:32 ff: "Don't put a stumbling-block in anyone's way whether Jew or Greek or Christian. Personally, I try to satisfy everybody on every point. I don't pursue my own advantage, but that of the public, with a view to their salvation. In this respect you had better imitate me as I imitate Christ." Or the beginning of Hebrews: "In the old days God spoke to our ancestors in a partial and inconclusive way through the prophets. Now, at the end of this era, He has spoken to us through His Son. . . . He is the reflection of the Father's Glory and bears impressed upon Him the very character of the Father." In such a rendition something of the dignity of the original has undoubtedly been lost, but there is nothing to make the reader hesitate at what is meant—and to achieve this result was Bishop Wand's aim.

Here and there, to be sure, one feels that clarity has been gained by adopting a more than dubious rendition. In Gal. 3:20 the version is, "It is obvious that an intermediary acts for more than one party; in this case the other is God." But what Paul means is the precise opposite: since a mediator acts for more than one party and since God is only one party, in this case the medi-

ator does *not* act for God. And occasionally the translation is controversially "Anglican," as the use of "Eucharist" in I Cor. 14:16 and "Bishop" in Titus 1:7 (in both instances with a capital letter). But criticisms of this sort are perhaps captious; the task Bishop Wand has set himself he has performed with very real ability, and he has made it genuinely possible to "read whole books of the Bible at one sitting."

Users of the book, however, should be warned that his little introductions are so extremely conservative as to be almost—or quite—obscurantist. Not only Ephesians but the Pastorals as well are assigned to Paul; both Jude and James were written by "brothers of the Lord"; and even II Peter incorporates genuine Petrine fragments!

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

Neoplatonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine. Vol. I, *Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine.* By BRUNO SWITALSKI. New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1946. xxxii, 113 pp. $3.95.

This volume is the English version of a book which was first published in Polish in 1938. It is to be followed by another volume which will discuss Augustine's relations to Porphyry.

To this reviewer, it appears as the chief value of the present volume that from the material gathered therein a new problem arises. Whereas Plotinus' influence on Augustine prior and immediately after his conversion has been frequently discussed, a reader of this book will realize that Augustine continued to use the *Enneads* long after his sojourn in Cassiciacum. What did these studies include and for what purpose were they made? No exhaustive answer has yet been given. But Switalski's collection of several direct references to Plotinus from the ninth and tenth books of *De Civitate Dei* will help to solve this problem.

Unfortunately Switalski's own analysis seems not quite satisfactory. He pays no attention to the nuances which determine the "influence" of one author on another. There is another shortcoming which is closely related to the former. In spite of his attempt to separate "the role played by the *Enneads* of Plotinus in the conversion of St. Augustine" from "Plotinian ideas embodied in Augustine's ethics," Switalski does not clearly distinguish between the biographical problem and the doxographic. In the final analysis, this is due to an ambiguity in the author's philosophy of interpretation. Whereas, for the most part, he accepts the method of a critical investigation of sources and influences, on the other hand, he asserts that many of the agreements between Plotinus and Augustine concern "natural truths" which "are accessible to the human mind without outside influences." This, he thinks, is especially important for judging "a mental genius like Augustine." Even in his final conclusions, the author seems to waver between the view that Augustine "completed" Plotinus' ethics and the somewhat different view that Augustine "selected" such ideas from the pagan philosopher as would be in harmony with the teachings of the Church.

The discussion of the relations between Plotinus and Augustine is preceded by a brief outline of the ethical teachings of the two. Switalski believes that these teachings can be reduced to two systems of sentences defining the means and ends of moral conduct. Thus he summarizes the views of both authors on the highest good, the way leading to happiness, the virtues, evil, freedom of will, etc., but makes no attempt to integrate these sentences with Plotinus' or Augustine's inner experience.

Switalski considers Augustine's ethics as "a philosophical amplification of moral principles as comprised in the doctrines of Christ and taught by the Catholic Church." Plotinus, on the other hand, is for him a teacher of a "sublime" but "abnormal" idealism. Switalski is particularly critical of Plotinus' treatment of virtue, which seems to him "very superficial" and "permeated with the spirit of intellectualism, individualism and mysticism." In the author's view, Augustine overcame the shortcomings of intellectualism and individualism (whether of mysticism, too, is not quite clear) when he completed the discussion of the cardinal virtues by addition of the theological ones, especially love (charity).

The author states correctly that "love occupies a central part in Augustine's ethics," but a reader who would expect to find here an interpretation of this central idea will be greatly disappointed. Switalski merely defines love with the help of a few brief quotations. It seems, indeed, likely that the problem of love would be the crucial problem in a comparative analysis of the two thinkers, yet this would require a different approach than is compatible with an inflexible system of definitions.

Throughout the volume the author abundantly quotes from the original texts. A bibliography which, as far as Plotinian studies are concerned, is nearly complete is a valuable addition to the book.

ERNST MORITZ MANASSE

Le Mystère primordial. By TAYMANS D'EYPERNON, S.J. Brussells: L'Édition Universelle; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1946. 194 pp. 90 fr.

Father d'Eypernon has given us a very interesting study of the fashion in which the Blessed Trinity is manifested by the economics of the "persons" in the natural order and in the Christian life, with a series of chapters on analogies to the Trinity drawn from scientific research, literary work, and aesthetic creation. In certain ways the book is strikingly reminiscent of Miss Dorothy L. Sayers' charming *Mind of the Maker,* published a few years ago; the same apt use of natural experience and study to illuminate the supernatural reality of the Trinity marks his study.

The author begins with a presentation of the facts of Christian revelation, with a strong emphasis on the *event* side of the picture. His only failure here is a quite understandable ignorance of—or perhaps disregard of—biblical criticism; he himself realizes this to some degree, for he apologizes, in a fashion, for his straight use of Johannine material in the matter of the deity of Christ and the relation of the Holy Spirit to his work. From this survey he moves on

to a discussion of the areas in which the reality of God is signally manifested in human experience, with the implications which this bears for our knowledge of "the divine society" (both the Trinity and the Catholic Church are included in such a phrase, on different levels, of course), and the insight we receive thereby into *la vie personelle de Dieu.*

The reviewer is in sympathy with the line of approach and the conclusions drawn, although it is quite clear that to a neo-orthodox theologian, such as Brunner, they would be entirely unacceptable. Here is Catholic thought in its Roman mode, at its best and clearest; it trusts human reason, even while it acknowledges its defects, and it demands that we follow the reason in its two kinds of study in regard to divinity: first, as giving us conclusions—tentative and perhaps "vague," in von Hügel's sense—as to the nature of God; and second, as enabling us to understand human experience itself, in its widest ranges, in the light of that theological point of view.

We commend the study heartily, not least because its style is so charming and clear. An example of this style is the following paragraph:

Ce que la tradition chrétienne nous dit, c'est que Dieu est Amour et qu'en lui seul se trouve la Béatitude. Dieu est le Bonheur. Dès lors, s'il nous aime vraiment, il ne peut pas nous vouloir autrement que conformes à lui. Etre fait à sa mesure, c'est être fait à la mesure du Bonheur parfait. Mais cette mesure est infinie. Et voici le prodigieux tour de force que seul l'amour divin peut réaliser: faire de créatures, dont l'essence même est la limite, des êtres capables de voir et d'aimer comme l'Infini. L'ambition de Dieu à notre endroit n'est pas moindre que cela: il nous faut devenir des fils d'adoption, conformes en tout au Fils Unique; il nous faut être faits à la mesure de Dieu.

W. Norman Pittenger

The Living Liturgy. By Massey Hamilton Shepherd, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. x, 139 pp. $2.25.

The major part of this book is an analysis and appreciation, tempered with discrete criticism, of the Book of Common Prayer, by the Professor of Church History in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. As such it will be of primary—and perhaps in many parts of exclusive—interest to Episcopalians and other Anglicans. None the less, as Doctor Shepherd notes, the liturgical movement "has already far overstepped the boundaries of the so-called liturgical churches. Many leaders of Protestant free churches . . . are vitally interested, and they bid fair to outstrip the Anglicans in devotion to the cause" (p. 6). In point of fact, use of extracts from the Book of Common Prayer is extremely common nowadays among non-Anglicans, and those who so use it will find this book of Dr. Shepherd's most helpful in pointing out what to employ, what to modify and what to discard.

Other portions of the book will be of use to Christians of any denomination, especially the opening section on the liturgical movement and its principles, and the section near the end on "Music and Architecture." Here one

sentence may be cited to illustrate the sapient and epigrammatic style that characterizes the entire book: "Do not embarass the (organ) by making its stately pipes objects of veneration" (p. 120).

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

Eyes of Faith. By PAUL S. MINEAR. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminister Press, 1946. 307 pp. $3.00.

This is an important book on a theme of central significance to the Christian faith. One can read it and be convinced, or remained unconvinced—but one cannot read it thoughtfully without being stirred to ask whether his former understanding of the Bible was rightly based.

The sub-title of the book is "A Study of the Biblical Point of View." This, with the fact that its author is Professor of New Testament Interpretation at Andover-Newton Theological Seminary, may lead one to expect a systematic treatment of biblical theology. This it is, but not in the usual sense of an analysis of doctrines. Rather, it is an attempt to get at the "point of standing" of the biblical writers from which they looked at God, the world, their duty and destiny, the future of Israel, the coming of the Deliverer, in short, everything that impinged upon human existence. It is the author's contention that only as we stand, by faith and sympathetic imagination, where they stood, can we hope to grasp what the Bible is saying.

Most thoughtful students of the Bible will agree with this general principle. What is not so likely to be accepted is Professor Minear's conviction that there is a unity of perspective in the Bible. So convinced is he of this unity that citations are drawn from throughout the entire Bible to be placed side by side, more being taken from Deuteronomy, Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel than from other books. It would be inaccurate to say that these are placed together without regard to context, for the author is too informed and careful a biblical scholar to do any cheap proof-texting. But since the context is, in many instances, not apparent to the reader, the question keeps recurring as to whether the unity is really as great as the author maintains.

The key to the Bible's unitary point of viewing is that God visits man. God speaks, and man responds. God acts, and man becomes aware of the deeper meanings of his existence. "If one deletes from the Bible all references to God's visits and their implications, nothing is left. . . . There remains no Biblical faith; there remains no Bible" (p. 11). With this as the primary point of vision, many ramifications are found, but with a common center. The book traces these in four parts, which the author calls the *angle* of vision (the appearance of God to man in the sense of election, decision, conflict, community, time and destiny); the *focus* of vision (revelation); the *horizons* of vision (the kingdom of God and history); the *re-vision* of vision (the coming of the Messiah and the Christian's new horizons).

At each point in the discussion of these great themes, there are profound insights stated with fine literary skill. With the author's main contention that

the Bible is, above all, centered in God's approach to man, I am in agreement, though I believe he develops the theme too largely from the Old Testament. More attention to the Sermon on the Mount, nowhere cited and touched only with a glancing reference, would have shifted the perspective to a greater ethical emphasis. The author is right that faith is basic to the biblical point of view and to our grasp of it. No amount of speculative philosophizing or systematizing can reach its living center. But when, in the last chapter, he appears to rule out any approach but faith to the knowledge of God, I cannot go with him. If he and others of the "existential" school of thought did not apprehend God and the Bible by critical judgment as well as by faith, they would be naïve fundamentalists, instead of authors of such penetrating studies as this one is.

GEORGIA HARKNESS

Spirit in Crisis. By HENK OOSTERINK. Covina, Calif.: Theosophical University Press, 1946. xii, 65 pp. $1.25.

This is a remarkable little book written by an Amsterdam lawyer during the blackest years of his country's suffering under the German occupation. In respect to its setting, it reminds one of Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy,* for, although the author apparently did not himself suffer imprisonment, his suffering in his country's enslavement was no less poignant. However, here, the philosophy which consoles and strengthens is that version of Oriental philosophy taught by the Theosophical movement, of which the author has been, for many years, an adherent. The book has a certain antiphonal character, for the meditations on man's true nature as part of the Boundless Self of the Cosmos, are interrupted by bald, objective statements of the bitter facts of the occupation—the murder of hostages, persecution of the Jews, confiscation of property, starvation! The method by which the author preserved his mental balance in the midst of chaos was the time-honored one of regular daily periods of meditation—a lost art which the West might do well to revive.

M. B.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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